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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although relative income poverty rates vary from year to year, the 
rankings of different industrialised countries according to these 
poverty measures tend to be rather stable. Ireland is consistently 
among a group of countries with relative income poverty rates 
considerably above the European Union average (though not as high 
as the USA). This has not changed over the course of Ireland’s 
recent economic boom, since our relative income poverty rates 
themselves have not fallen – indeed they have generally risen – over 
that period. This study asks why Ireland has higher relative income 
poverty rates than many of our EU partners? More specifically, it 
explores what we can learn from an in-depth comparison with a 
number of other European countries, including some of the best 
performers in the European Union in terms of that indicator. 
This approach has parallels with a number of developments in 
the social and employment policy agenda at EU level. Atkinson 
(2000) notes that the Belgian government proposed that all member 
states should seek to match the performance of the three best states 
in combating poverty. This links closely with the “open method of 
co-ordination” agreed at Lisbon, “a process in which clear and 
mutually agreed objectives are defined, after which peer review, on 
the basis of national action plans, enables EU Member States to 
compare practices and learn from each other. This method respects 
– and is in fact built upon – local diversity.” (Vandenbroucke, 2002). 
Similarly, the UK’s new targets for child poverty include a criterion 
that the UK rate should be “among the best in Europe”.1
We begin (Chapter 2) by discussing the nature of relative income 
poverty rates as poverty measures, their limitations and uses and 
their growing importance in an EU context. Chapter 3 then looks at 
how relative income poverty rates actually vary across EU member 
states, using the latest harmonised data. Chapter 4 reviews some of 
the main findings of previous investigations into cross-country 
differences in relative income poverty rates, and undertakes a new 
investigation of the role of wage inequality in explaining differences 
in relative income poverty. Our research then employs a variety of 
1 Department of Work and Pensions (2003) notes that “Possible ways to define 
being ‘among the best in Europe’ could include: having a relative child poverty rate 
no higher than the average of the best three countries in Europe; having a relative 
child poverty rate no higher than the average of the best four countries in Europe;  
and having a relative child poverty rate that was within 2 percentage points of the 
average of  the best three countries in Europe.” 
2 WHY IS RELATIVE INCOME POVERTY SO HIGH IN IRELAND? 
 
 
analytic approaches to see what is distinctive about Ireland. The 
implications for relative income poverty rates of differences in age 
structure, household structure, and labour market conditions are 
explored in Chapter 5, focusing on five countries. This is done by 
simulating what the relative income poverty rate would be if each of 
these countries shared a common age structure, household structure 
or pattern of unemployment and labour market participation. This 
exercise – and other studies carried out elsewhere – point towards 
the importance of social protection as a key influence. In Chapter 6 
we therefore look in detail at social protection spending in Ireland 
compared with other EU countries. What would be the impact on 
relative poverty if the level and/or structure of social protection 
spending in Ireland were to become similar to that of countries with 
low poverty rates, such as Denmark and the Netherlands? We 
explore this question using SWITCH, the Irish tax-benefit model. 
The main findings are drawn together in Chapter 7. 
As well as setting out the focus of the study, it is important to be 
clear at the outset about what it does not seek to do. In particular, 
while it looks at the impact of higher social protection spending on 
the numbers below relative income thresholds, it does not attempt to 
examine how that higher spending might be financed,2 or what 
dynamic effects both higher spending and taxes might have on the 
behaviour of those affected, and on the macroeconomy. These are 
critically important issues. We have set out in previous studies the 
complex analytical issues that arise in trying to capture such 
behavioural effects at the level of the individual and household. 
While progress has been made in that direction (see for example, 
Callan et al., 2003), much remains to be done before these effects can 
be comprehensively modelled. At the macroeconomic level, the 
relationship between taxation and economic growth is of course 
both much researched and hotly disputed, and Irish experience over 
the last ten decades or more also requires a good deal more research 
in that context. Our aim in this study is to ask more limited but key 
questions about relative income poverty, and the results serve among 
other things to highlight the importance of greater clarity on these 
overarching behavioural and macroeconomic  issues. 
2 The simple assumption made in Chapter 6 is that higher costs are financed by 
higher income tax rates, but this is only one of many possible financing methods. 
3 
2. UNDERSTANDING 
RELATIVE INCOME 
POVERTY MEASURES 
Relative income poverty rates measure poverty in terms of the 
percentage falling below income thresholds derived as proportions 
of mean or median income in the country in question. These income 
thresholds are often set at 50 per cent or 60 per cent of mean or 
median income. Such poverty measures have two central features. 
The first is that they rely entirely on household income as the 
indicator of resources, living standards and capacity to participate in 
the life of society. The second is that the benchmark of adequacy 
used in assessing whether a household has sufficient income moves 
strictly in line with the average (or median) income in the society. 
Because of these features, relative income poverty rates have serious 
limitations if used as the sole indicator of the level of poverty or of 
the types of household experiencing poverty.  
These limitations have been discussed in depth in previous  
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) studies of poverty in 
Ireland and in the EU, as well as in an increasing volume of other 
studies. Analysis of non-monetary indicators of deprivation for Irish 
households has shown the extent to which deprivation scores vary 
across households at similar income levels, with significant numbers 
of those falling below relative income poverty thresholds having 
relatively low deprivation scores. Regression analysis of the 
determinants of deprivation shows that, while current income does 
play a role, other indicators of longer-term resources and needs are 
better predictors of  deprivation scores (see for example, Nolan and 
Whelan, 1996). Such findings have been broadly replicated in a series 
of studies using harmonised household survey data for other EU 
member states from the European Community Household Panel 
Survey (see, for example, Layte et al., 2001; Whelan et al., 2002). They 
arise essentially because a household’s level of relative deprivation 
depends on its command over resources and its needs compared 
with others in the same society, not just on its measured income.  
This provides the essential rationale for seeking to measure levels 
of deprivation directly, and using non-monetary indicators together 
with income to measure and understand poverty. The measure of 
‘consistent’ poverty developed at the ESRI seeks to do this with 
Irish data; the construction of this measure and the way it has 
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evolved over time are detailed in a series of studies of poverty in 
Ireland (see, for example, Callan, Nolan and Whelan, 1993; Nolan 
and Whelan 1996; Callan et al., 1996; Layte et al., 2001; and most 
recently Nolan et al., 2002). In summary, it identifies as poor those 
who are both below relative income poverty lines and experiencing 
basic deprivation, with basic deprivation being captured by a specific 
set of non-monetary indicators which analysis has suggested best suit 
that purpose. This measure provides a more reliable basis than 
relative income alone on which to identify those who are unable to 
participate in the ordinary life of the society due to lack of resources. 
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy has framed its poverty reduction 
targets in terms of this ‘consistent’ poverty measure. Difficult issues 
have to be faced in constructing the measure about the choice of 
non-monetary indicators and how best to adapt these over time as 
living standards and expectations adjust, and these once again have 
been discussed in the studies mentioned. 
While relative income poverty rates have serious limitations as a 
measure of poverty at a point in time, they do contain valuable 
information about underlying trends, which will have major 
implications for the design of policy and for the way poverty is likely 
to evolve in the future. As we have argued in previous publications, 
the ‘consistent’ poverty measure on its own cannot be expected to 
tell the whole story, particularly in the quite unusual set of 
circumstances Ireland has recently experienced. Average incomes 
have grown exceptionally rapidly, those on low incomes have shared 
in that growth and seen their real living standards rise significantly, 
but those relying on social welfare have not kept pace with the 
increase in incomes from work. The ‘consistent’ poverty measure – 
showing a substantial decline in the numbers unable to afford what 
are regarded as basic necessities – is certainly capturing a central 
feature of what has happened over this period, which a purely 
relative income poverty standard – showing no progress or even a 
deterioration – misses.  
However, particularly over a lengthy and more “normal” period 
when living standards are growing less rapidly, ignoring the 
evolution of the numbers falling below purely relative income 
thresholds may also mean an important part of the story is being 
missed. As incomes reach higher levels and ordinary living standards 
improve, societal expectations will also adjust and may catch up and 
adjust fully to higher average incomes. Higher real incomes and 
lower deprivation levels do not necessarily then mean that everyone 
is able to participate fully in society, precisely because what is 
involved in “participating fully” itself evolves over time as ordinary 
living standards improve.  
The key challenge in setting and monitoring poverty targets is 
thus to capture the reality of rising living standards and falling 
deprivation, but also take into account the long-term consequences 
of lower incomes, and social security rates in particular, lagging 
behind the average. We have suggested that what is required is a 
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broadening in the scope of NAPS poverty targets (see Nolan, 1999, 
2000, Callan et al., 1999). As well as the combined income/ 
deprivation measure, there could be distinct targets for the key 
elements underpinning it. Whatever about the way targets are 
formulated, it is clear that anti-poverty policy needs to be framed in 
the light of an understanding of Ireland’s relative income poverty 
rate. In examining the evolution of poverty over the 1990s, we have 
in previous studies identified the key factors underpinning recent 
trends in relative income poverty – notably the fact that incomes 
from work rose more rapidly than transfers from the social welfare 
system. What that did not address, however, were the reasons why 
Ireland has a comparatively high percentage falling below such 
relative income thresholds in the first place: it is this underlying 
structural question, rather than recent trends, which is the concern 
of the present study. 
The importance of exploring these structural factors is reinforced 
by the nature of the social inclusion indicators recently adopted at 
EU level. In December 2001, the European Council held at Laeken 
in Belgium adopted a set of commonly agreed and defined indicators 
of social inclusion, which will in the future play a central role in 
monitoring the performance of the Member States in promoting 
social inclusion. These indicators are intended to allow the Member 
States and the Commission to monitor progress towards the goal set 
by the European Council of Lisbon of making a decisive impact on 
the eradication of poverty by 2010. They were developed by the 
Social Protection Committee and its Indicators Sub-Group, which 
recommended that a specific set of Primary and Secondary 
Indicators be employed. The first of the Primary Indicators is the 
percentage falling below 60 per cent of median income in the 
country in question.  
The Indicators Sub-Group emphasised that this was to be seen as 
a measure of people who are “at risk of being poor”, not a measure 
of poverty – and for that reason it is labelled the “low income rate”. 
It is complemented by other Primary indicators also based on this 
relative income threshold. One measures the depth of the shortfall 
for those below the 60 per cent threshold. Another measures low 
income persistence, that is the number of people below 60 per cent 
of median income who had also been below that income line for at 
least two of the previous three years. The Secondary indicators also 
include the numbers below alternative relative income thresholds, set 
at 40 per cent, 50 per cent and 70 per cent of the median. In addition 
they also include a “low income rate” where the income threshold is 
anchored at a moment in time and indexed to price increases rather 
than purely relative (indexed to median income as it changes over 
time). However, in tracking low income the dominant focus in the 
agreed social inclusion indicators is clearly on relative income 
thresholds. Since performance vis-à-vis those thresholds is going to 
receive a great deal of attention at EU level, it is all the more 
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important to understand the factors underlying Ireland’s ranking in 
terms of this “low income” or relative income poverty rate. 
7 
3. RELATIVE INCOME 
POVERTY:  
IRELAND IN 
COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
So where does Ireland rank in terms of relative income poverty? 
The obvious place to start in answering this question is with the 
figures, produced by Eurostat from the European Community 
Household Panel Survey, presented among the agreed indicators of 
social inclusion in the EU’s Second Joint Report on Social Inclusion 
(2004). We reproduce in Table 3.1 the figures shown there for  the 
percentage falling below 60 per cent of median income in each of 
the EU Member States, for 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001. (Note that 
while these are the years the survey results presented were gathered, 
the income figures in fact refer to the previous calendar year.) 
We see that in 1995, Ireland had 19 per cent of persons below 
this relative income threshold (in terms of their household income, 
adjusted to take differences in household size and composition into 
account). Only Greece, Portugal, Italy and the UK had higher 
figures, while Spain had the same rate. These countries were all well 
above the EU average of about 15 per cent. Belgium, France and 
Germany were about that average, Austria and Luxembourg were on 
12-13 per cent, and the Netherlands was on 11 per cent. Denmark 
had the lowest rates, at 10 per cent. (Data for Finland and Sweden 
were not then available.) 
If we look now at 2001, then Ireland’s relative income poverty 
rate has risen to 21 per cent while the countries which had higher 
rates in 1995 have seen declines, leaving Ireland with the highest rate 
in the (then) EU-15.  
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Table 3.1: Percentage of Persons Below 60 Per Cent of Median Equivalised Income, Modified 
OECD Scale, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001 
 Percentage of Persons Below 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
 1995 1997 1999 2001 
Sweden .. 8 8 9 
Denmark 10 10 10 10 
Finland .. 8 11 11 
Germany 15 12 11 11 
Netherlands 11 10 11 11 
Austria 13 13 12 12 
Luxembourg 12 11 13 12 
Belgium 16 14 13 13 
France 15 15 15 15 
UK 20 18 19 17 
Spain 19 20 19 19 
Italy 20 19 18 19 
Greece 22 21 21 20 
Portugal 23 22 21 20 
Ireland 19 19 19 21 
     
EU average       15 14 13 13 
Source:: Joint Report on Social Inclusion (2004), Statistical Annex Table 1. Countries ranked by 2001 relative income 
poverty rate. EU average on the basis of population size. 
 
It is worth pointing out that there have been some questions 
raised about the reliability of the figures from the ECHP for certain 
countries. The figures for Belgium, for example, have been criticised 
by Belgian researchers.3 The British figures for 1997 are presented 
with a “health warning” that they are not strictly comparable with 
the 1995 and 1996 data and are being revised. Sweden did not 
participate in the ECHP, so the figures for that country are drawn 
from national sources, as are those for Denmark in preference to 
ones from the ECHP. More broadly, the ECHP as a panel survey 
tries to follow individuals from one year to the next, and suffers 
from attrition as it does so. This means that it may be less likely to 
adequately represent the population of the country in question as 
time goes on than in the initial years of the survey, despite efforts to 
 
3 Validation of income poverty figures from the ECHP for  France, the 
Netherlands and the UK in Eurostat (2000a) shows reasonably close 
correspondence with national figures, but Van Hoorebeeck et al. (2000) show that 
in national studies estimates of poverty in Belgium are generally lower than the 
ECHP. Eurostat (2000b) suggests the extent of under-reporting of income is higher 
in several of the southern countries and for this reason cautions against 
comparisons of average income across countries from the ECHP. Poverty levels 
assessed vis-à-vis “absolute” thresholds in purchasing power terms could be 
particularly seriously affected by such variation, as Smeeding et al. (2000) point out, 
but the numbers and types of household falling below relative income could also be 
affected. 
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weight the responses to correct for such biases. The extent of 
attrition varies across countries, and for this and other reasons the 
reliability of the figures may also vary somewhat. 
For these reasons the broad grouping of countries in terms of 
percentages below the 60 per cent of median threshold should 
probably be given more weight than the precise ranking. This clearly 
shows Ireland to be among a group of six countries with relative 
income poverty rates well above the EU average, and much higher 
than those in the best-performing countries. It is on this basis that 
Ireland’s position compared with other countries is most often 
assessed, and a key aim of the present study is to explore the factors 
underlying that ranking.  
While numbers below the 60 per cent threshold receive most 
attention, including in the agreed EU social inclusion indicators, 
alternative relative income thresholds can be adopted and may not 
show the same picture. To see what difference this makes, Table 3.2 
shows the numbers falling below the alternative thresholds of 40 per 
cent, 50 per cent and 70 per cent of the median, again based on data 
from the ECHP and published by Eurostat.  
Table 3.2: Percentage of Persons Below 40 Per Cent, 50 Per Cent and 70 Per Cent of Median 
Equivalised Income, Modified OECD Scale, 2001 
 Percentage of Persons Below: 
 40 Per Cent of 
Median 
50 Per Cent of 
Median 
60 Per Cent of 
Median 
70 Per Cent of 
Median 
Sweden 2 5 9 17 
Denmark 2 4 10 19 
Finland 2 6 11 20 
Germany 3 6 11 19 
Netherlands 4 6 11 19 
Austria 3 6 12 19 
Luxembourg 3 6 12 21 
Belgium 2 6 13 21 
France 4 9 15 23 
UK 5 11 17 26 
Spain 7 13 19 27 
Italy 8 13 19 27 
Greece 8 14 20 28 
Portugal 6 13 20 28 
IRELAND 5 15 21 29 
     
EU average 5 9 15 23 
Source:: Joint Report on Social Inclusion (2004), Statistical Annex Table 1.  
Countries ranked by 50 per cent median relative income poverty rate. 
 
The lowest threshold, of 40 per cent of the median, is very low 
indeed and would not customarily be employed in an Irish context. 
The Irish figure of 5 per cent below this threshold in 2001 is the 
same as the EU average, while Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal 
have higher figures. 
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Unlike the 40 per cent threshold, a threshold set at 50 per cent of 
median income is commonly used as a core poverty/low income 
indicator in a number of EU countries. We see from Table 3.2 that 
with this threshold, at 15 per cent Ireland has the highest relative 
income poverty rate in the EU. This is also true for the percentage 
falling below the highest relative income threshold, of 70 per cent of 
the median. (Like the 40 per cent of median threshold, in other 
member states this would generally be seen as useful for sensitivity 
analysis rather than as a core threshold.)  
It is worth noting that figures for 1995 for these alternative 
thresholds show rather a different picture: with the lower thresholds 
Ireland had a below-average relative income poverty rate at that 
stage. However, the increase over the period in the numbers falling 
below these thresholds was such that Ireland’s ranking deteriorated 
markedly. This arose as average income grew exceptionally rapidly in 
Ireland, faster than social welfare transfers – a phenomenon analysed 
in depth in previous studies, notably Whelan et al. (2003). 
It is worth putting these figures for the EU members in a broader 
comparative context. While it is difficult to obtain as high a degree 
of comparability given the absence of a common data source, the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database contains data for a 
broader range of developed countries and seeks to maximise 
comparability in terms of definitions etc. Table 3.3 presents figures 
derived from that source for the percentage falling below 50 per cent 
of median income in various OECD countries in the early/mid 
1990s.4 We see that among the accession countries the Czech 
Republic had very few people below half median income, while 
Hungary and Poland had about 10-12 per cent in that position, 
similar to the EU average. Broadening the comparison to North 
America, we see that Canada also had 11 per cent below that 
threshold. The USA, however, had about 20 per cent below that 
relative income threshold, among the highest of the countries 
covered.  
The key finding in terms of Ireland’s comparative position is thus 
that the numbers falling below relative income thresholds are indeed 
considerably above the EU average when a relative income threshold 
set at 60 per cent of the median – roughly the same as half the mean 
income – is used. It is critical to elucidate why this is the case to 
inform the development of an appropriate strategy and policies, 
particularly since this measure has been adopted as a key indicator at 
EU level. Ireland’s ranking is, however, considerably better when 
lower relative thresholds are employed, and the factors underlying 
that element of the picture also merit investigation. 
4 Note that the way incomes are adjusted for household size and composition 
differs from the figures presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 based on the ECHP and 
those in Table 3.3 based on the Luxembourg Income study database; within Table 
3.3 there are also differences between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and 
the other countries in that respect. 
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Table 3.3: Relative Income Poverty in Industrialised Countries in the 
Luxembourg Income Study, Early-Mid 1990s 
Country (Date) Per Cent of Persons Below 50 Per 
Cent of Median Equivalised 
Income 
Czech Republic (1992) 1.3 
Sweden (1992) 2.9 
Finland (1991) 3.2 
Luxembourg (1994) 4.4 
Austria (1992) 4.8 
Denmark (1992) 4.9 
Belgium (1992) 5.7 
Netherlands (1991) 6.5 
Germany (1994) 8.5 
France (1994) 9.4 
Hungary (1994) 9.9 
Spain (1990) 10.3 
Canada (1994) 11.4 
Poland (1992) 11.6 
IRELAND (1987) 12.2 
UK (1995) 15.1 
Italy (1995) 15.6 
USA (1994) 20.7 
Source: Bradbury and Jantti (1999), Table 3.6 p. 33, calculated from LIS.  
 
 
4. IDENTIFYING KEY 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
In this chapter we begin by considering a selection of international 
studies seeking to explain cross-country differences in relative 
income poverty rates. Drawing on the findings and methods of such 
studies, we then identify some key factors for detailed investigation 
in later chapters. 
4.1 
Introduction
 
 In a  review of poverty in advanced countries, Jannti and Danziger 
(2000) note the complexity of the processes determining household 
income. Relevant factors include choices regarding education and 
training, marriage and household formation, labour supply decisions 
and fertility choices. These choices are influenced by a range of 
public policies – taxes, transfers, policies on health and on education 
for example. Jannti and Danziger point out that No empirical economic 
analysis of income poverty can incorporate all of these behaviors… Any analysis 
takes many of the behavioral factors as given, either for analytical tractability or 
because of data limitations. For many questions, however, analysis of only some 
aspects of policy will suffice.  
4.2 
International 
Studies
There is, therefore, no single approach to “decomposing” 
differences in relative income poverty across countries and 
attributing parts of the difference to different factors. Here we 
review briefly some of the most distinctive contributions to this 
literature, in order to identify some of the key factors and methods 
to be used in our investigation of the gap between relative income 
poverty in Ireland and countries with some of the lowest poverty 
rates in the EU. 
Biewen and Jenkins (2002) point out that when a low poverty 
rate is observed in a particular country, this may arise  
(a) because relatively few individuals in this country have 
characteristics usually associated with poverty (e.g., 
unemployment, illness or lone parenthood) or 
(b) because, although there are many individuals with 
characteristics linked to a high risk of poverty, the risk in 
that country, given those characteristics, is itself low relative 
to the risk in other countries. 
Building on this perspective, they developed a framework for 
studying the relationship between poverty and personal 
characteristics, which allows a decomposition of differences in 
12 
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poverty rates across countries.5 Applying this method to the USA, 
Great Britain and Germany they find that most of the poverty 
difference between the US and Britain, and between the US and 
Germany was accounted for by higher US risks of poverty for any 
given set of personal characteristics. This was partly offset by a more 
favourable distribution of household characteristics in the US, 
principally a higher employment rate. 
Bourguignon et al. (2002) developed a micro-econometric 
method to account for differences across distributions of household 
income. This allows decomposition of inequality or poverty 
measures into shares due to differences in the structure of labour 
market returns, differences in occupational structure, and differences 
in the underlying distribution of assets (endowment effects). An 
application of the method to a comparison between Brazil and the 
USA finds that most of the higher inequality in Brazil is due to 
“underlying inequalities in the distribution of two key endowments: 
access to education and to sources of non-labour income, mainly 
pensions”.6
Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) analyse the contribution of 
changes in the distribution of primary incomes, changes in transfers 
and changes in taxes to the increase in inequality in disposable 
income in the Netherlands.7 The implicit assumption is that the 
incidence of taxes and employee social insurance contributions is on 
employee earnings, while employer contributions and indirect taxes 
fall to firms to pay.8 Given this assumption, they find that transfers 
account for about 40 per cent of the increase in inequality, with 
increased inequality of primary income accounting for 35 per cent 
and taxes 25 per cent over the period 1981 to 1987. 
Gardiner (1997) summarises in a useful diagram (Figure 4.1) 
many of the factors involved in moving from individual earnings to 
disposable income per adult equivalent at household level. The 
boxes labelled Y1 to Y10 represent income sources, while structural 
or compositional factors are identified in boxes C1 to C4. For 
example, both hourly earnings (Y1) and hours of work (C1) help to  
 
5 The set of characteristics includes elements relating to demographics, labour 
market participation and educational qualifications. 
6 The use of the term “endowment” to cover access to education and entitlements 
to pensions is somewhat problematic: clearly access to education is not something 
which is determined at birth, but depends on public policy. The distinction in the 
analysis might be characterised more precisely as one between “assets” – whether 
endowed at or as a result of birth or otherwise - and “returns to assets”.  
7 The Theil index (mean log deviation) is used because it allows changes in 
inequality to be decomposed in this way. (Cowell, 2000). 
8 For a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence see Smolensky, Hoyt 
and Danziger (1987). 
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Figure 4.1: Composition of Household Equivalised Disposable 
Income, Gardiner (1997) 
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determine the distribution of individual earnings (Y2). This diagram 
suggests a number of possible areas for investigation. Here we single 
out three. 
Earnings (Y2) constitute the preponderant component of market 
income in most industrialised countries, and have, in consequence a 
major influence on disposable income. We know that there is 
considerable diversity across countries in the dispersion of individual 
earnings (Atkinson et al., 1995) and that within countries earnings 
dispersion can change quite sharply over time. These considerations 
suggest that it would be of interest to know how such inter-country 
differences in earnings dispersion may affect relative income poverty 
comparisons. We investigate this issue further, using EUROMOD, 
in Section 4.3. 
Rates of household income poverty depend in part on the 
household formation and composition process (Boxes C3 and C4 in 
the diagram). In general, do individuals tend to marry a person 
similar to themselves in terms, for example, of educational 
background and attitude towards employment? If there is a strong 
tendency towards “assortative mating” (like marrying like), as it is 
termed, a country may tend to have a greater concentration of 
employment in “work-rich” households and of unemployment in 
“work-poor” households. This is not, of course, the only factor 
influencing the distribution of employment and unemployment 
across households (see Russell et al., 2004; Walsh, 2003).9
Transfer income (Y6) clearly has a direct role in reducing relative 
income poverty, but the level and structure of such support varies 
considerably across countries. It is to this issue that we now turn, 
drawing on work by Atkinson (2000) to provide an overview of the 
relationship between social security spending and relative income 
poverty. In Chapter 6, we undertake a more detailed investigation of 
differences between Ireland and countries with the lowest relative 
income poverty rates in the EU. 
Atkinson (2000) presents the results of fitting a very simple 
statistical model to the relationship between the poverty/low income 
rate in the EU member states in the mid-1990s and two explanatory 
variables: the proportion of GDP spent on social protection, and the 
proportion of the working-age population at work. The employment 
rate is not statistically significant but social protection spending is. 
This extremely simple model does well in predicting the percentage 
falling below 60 per cent of median income in a number of countries 
– such as Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, and Germany – and 
correctly predicts that countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland and 
Italy have much higher relative poverty rates than those countries.  
9 Tax and benefit systems themselves can influence this process, particularly if 
means-testing weakens financial work incentives in the case where one spouse is 
unemployed. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates this model.10 Each country is represented by 
a single point. The x-coordinate corresponds to the level of social 
spending, expressed as a percentage of GDP, and the y-coordinate 
plots the proportion of individuals falling below 60 per cent of 
median equivalised household income in that country. For most 
countries GNP and GDP are quite close, but the high incidence of 
multinational activity in Ireland means that GNP is significantly 
below GDP. For this reason, in the case of Ireland we use an 
expenditure to GNP ratio, rather than the ratio to GDP. 
 
Figure 4.2: Relative Income Poverty Rates and Social Security 
Spending as Per Cent of GDP, EU Countries, 1994 
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Interestingly, this model actually predicts that – given Ireland’s 
relatively low employment rate and social protection spending – the 
percentage below the 60 per cent relative income threshold would be 
somewhat higher than the actual level. This simple model would not 
purport to provide anything more than a suggestive summary of the 
overall relationships. None the less, it certainly serves to highlight 
the salience of social protection, which has to be kept in mind 
throughout. A replication of Atkinson’s analysis, using data for 1999, 
finds that the relationship identified in 1994 was considerably weaker 
by 1999.11 In part this reflects the fact that the Netherlands, Sweden 
 
10 The data contain some significant revisions from those used in the Atkinson 
(2002) paper, but the conclusions drawn in the previous paragraph remain valid. 
11 The R2 fell from 0.67 to 0.35, still significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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and Finland had managed to make substantial reductions in their 
total social security spending during the 1990s, while maintaining 
low relative income poverty rates. (In the case of the Netherlands 
the reduction may be due to changes in the definition of social 
protection expenditures.) The slope of the regression line is not 
much changed, indicating that an extra percentage point on the 
social security spending ratio “purchases” a similar reduction in 
relative income poverty.  
Atkinson’s (2000) analysis goes beyond this cross-country 
regression to look at the potential for reductions in relative income 
poverty through a universal benefit. Analysis using the EUROMOD 
tax-benefit model suggests that employing proportionate increase in 
social transfers to reduce a country's poverty rate from the EU-
average of 18 per cent to the best-performing average of 12 per cent 
would necessitate an increase in social transfers of some 2 per cent 
of GDP. 
 
 
EARNINGS INEQUALITY 4.3 
Key Factors We noted earlier, in discussing Gardiner’s (1997) framework, that 
earnings constitute the dominant source of income in modern 
industrialised societies, and that earnings inequality could play a role 
in explaining differences in relative income poverty. Earlier work 
(Nolan et al., 2000) on earnings inequality in Ireland has found that it 
was already quite high in 1987 relative to a range of countries, and 
rose sharply in subsequent years. This lends further weight to the 
notion that it may be useful to investigate the potential impact of 
earnings inequality on intercountry differences in relative income 
poverty. 
One possible analytical approach  would be to attempt to “scale” 
earnings inequality in Ireland down to the level seen in a comparator 
country (such as, say, Denmark). A number of choices would have 
to be made in implementing such an approach, but here we adopt a 
simpler method which avoids the need for such choices but 
generates some useful findings. Rather than compare two countries 
directly, we ask in each country, what would happen if earnings were 
distributed completely equally i.e., if each wage earner received 
exactly the same total earnings – irrespective of occupation, 
qualifications, industry, sex, marital status or hours worked. We term 
this scenario the “equal wage earnings counterfactual”. It would 
equalise wage earnings as between all those currently earning a wage 
– income inequalities arising from unemployment or non 
employment would continue. One could argue that an “equal hourly 
earnings” counterfactual would be also be of interest, but the “equal 
wage earnings” counterfactual goes beyond simply eliminating 
differences in hourly wages to remove hours worked as a source of 
income inequality. As we shall see, this is of considerable interest. 
Equalisation of wages has downstream implications in terms of 
income tax liabilities and social welfare entitlements. For this reason, 
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investigation of the impact of this hypothesis requires the use of a 
tax-benefit model. We have made use of the EUROMOD tax-
benefit model, which has been constructed using harmonised 
income concepts and measures of poverty. (For details of the 
construction of EUROMOD, see Sutherland, 2001, while up-to-date 
details of research using the model can be found at 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm). For the present 
analysis we are able to include results for four countries: Portugal, 
Denmark, the UK and Ireland, but not Germany or the 
Netherlands.12 Original data are from the year 1994 for Ireland, 
Portugal and Denmark, and for the period 1995/6 for the UK. In all 
cases incomes are uprated to the year 1998 and tax and welfare 
policies for that year are specified and simulated. 
Table 4.1: Reduction in Relative Income Poverty Associated with 
“Equal Wage Earnings” Counterfactual: Selected 
Countries, 1998 a
Head Count at 
50 Per Cent of 
Mean Income Simulated 1998b
Simulated 1998 with
Wage Earnings 
Equalised 
Reduction in 
Percentage Points 
 Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent Points 
Portugal 23.4 15.9 -7.5 
Denmark 6.1 3.7 -2.3 
UK 19.0 15.2 -3.8 
Ireland 18.9 17.1 -1.8 
Notes: a. Calculations using EUROMOD, see Immervoll, O’Donoghue and 
Sutherland (2000). Responsibility for the calculations rests wholly with 
the authors of this document, not with the EUROMOD team. 
b. The actual policy baseline as well as the alternative scenario must be 
simulated. Otherwise differences between the alternative scenario and the 
actual policy baseline which arise from discrepancies between the baseline 
simulation and the actual policy would be incorrectly deemed attributable 
to the equalisation of earnings. This approach is standard in such 
microsimulation analyses. 
 
Sources:  These results were generated using EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model for 
Europe. EUROMOD relies on micro-data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base made available by 
Eurostat for Denmark and Portugal and the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES), made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
through the Data Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and 
is used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive bear any 
responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. 
An equivalent disclaimer applies to the ECHP data. The work done using 
EUROMOD forms part of the MICRESA (Micro Analysis of the 
European Social Agenda) project, financed by the Improving Human 
Potential programme of the European Commission (SERD-2001-00099). 
 
Table 4.1 shows the rate of income poverty (per cent of 
individuals below half of mean equivalised income) under a baseline 
 
12 The results of the EUROMOD analysis are the responsibility of the present 
authors alone. 
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simulation and under the “equal wage earnings” counterfactual. For 
Portugal, there is a sharp reduction in the head count of relative 
income poverty. For the other three countries the change is smaller – 
less than 2 percentage points for Ireland, and something under 4 
percentage points for the UK. 
As the head count is a poverty measure which can be particularly 
sensitive to small changes for individuals located in the 
neighbourhood of the income poverty line, measures which take a 
wider view are needed to complement it. Table 4.2 shows the 
proportionate reduction in poverty under the head count measure, 
the “poverty gap” measure which takes into account how far 
individuals fall below the poverty line, and the “weighted poverty 
gap” which takes into account the distribution of such income 
shortfalls. On this basis it is clear that for all three poverty measures, 
wage equalisation leads to substantial proportionate reductions in 
income poverty in Denmark and the UK as well as Portugal. Ireland 
is the exception – wage equalisation has a rather limited impact, no 
matter which measure of relative income poverty is used. 
Table 4.2: Proportionate Reduction in Alternative Measures of 
Poverty under “Equal Wage Earnings” Counterfactual: 
Selected Countries, 1998 
 
Per Cent Reduction in Poverty Measure If All Wage 
Earners Received an Identical Wage 
 Portugal Denmark   UK Ireland 
Head count -32.0 -38.5 -19.9 -9.3 
Poverty gap -27.3 -37.2 -18.6 -6.3 
Weighted poverty gap -21.4 -26.1 -17.8 -4.4 
Note: Calculations using EUROMOD, see Immervoll, O’Donoghue and Sutherland 
(2000). Responsibility for the calculations rests wholly with the authors of this 
document, not with the EUROMOD team. 
 
What conclusions can we draw from this analysis? First, it seems 
that differences in earnings inequality between Ireland and, say, 
Denmark are not likely to play a large role in explaining the 
difference in relative income poverty between the two countries. 
Even if Irish earnings inequality were to be eliminated completely (as 
in the “equal wage earnings” counterfactual) it would have rather 
limited impact; so reducing Irish earnings inequality to the Danish 
level would have still less. 
Why is it the case that earnings inequality seems to have less 
impact in Ireland than elsewhere? Here we cannot claim to have a 
complete explanation, but a part of it may be due to the following. 
Low-wage households were a rather small proportion of all low 
income households in Ireland in the mid-1990s. They may have 
constituted a more significant share of the low income population 
for both Denmark and Portugal. This being so, a boost to their 
income could have a greater impact in these latter countries. 
When looking at broader measures of inequality rather than 
relative income poverty, the role played by market incomes in 
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explaining intercountry differences is somewhat greater. But this is 
not the focus here, and in explaining differences in relative income 
poverty between Ireland and such low-poverty countries as 
Denmark and the Netherlands, it seems that differences in wage 
inequality and rates of unemployment play a subsidiary role, not a 
dominant one. 
Household and Individual Characteristics 
The decomposition of Biewen and Jenkins (2002) stressed the need 
to identify groups in the population with different risks of poverty. 
Among the characteristics they used were: 
• the age profile of household members (the balance between 
numbers of elderly, numbers of adults and numbers of 
children), 
• the demographic composition of household. Lone parent 
households versus two parent family households versus 
multiple adult households, 
• the employment rate within the household. 
They found that most of the poverty difference between the US 
and either Britain or Germany was accounted for by the fact that US 
poverty rates tended to be higher than British or German rates when 
comparing individuals from the same categories across countries. 
The distribution of individuals across the categories played a rather 
minor role. 
 
 In this chapter we outlined a broad range of factors which could 
explain intercountry differences in relative income poverty, and 
reviewed some of the analyses which seek to identify the 
contribution made by the different factors. In the next chapter we 
investigate the role of factors such as these by looking at each in 
turn, and “standardising” on a particular age distribution or 
unemployment rate. If, intercountry differences are reduced when 
undertaken on this “standardised” basis, then differences in the 
factor concerned (e.g. age distribution of the population) help to 
explain observed differences in income poverty. But if not, we must 
look to other factors – for explanations. Prominent among these is 
the role of tax-transfer policy, investigated in Chapter 6. 
4.4 
Conclusions
 
5. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF 
LABOUR MARKET, 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
COMPOSITION AND 
HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES 
BY  SIMULATION 
In seeking to identify key factors affecting the numbers falling 
below relative income thresholds in Ireland versus other EU 
members, various candidates suggest themselves on the basis of 
what is known about the types of groups at high risk and the 
characteristics associated with low income. As seen in the previous 
chapter, such factors as unemployment (or non-employment) and 
lone parenthood are frequently associated with low income. There is 
also often a relationship between age and low income, though as we 
shall see the nature of this relationship is less consistent across 
countries. Thus we might expect, other things being equal, that a 
country with high levels of unemployment and lone parenthood 
would have an above-average percentage on low income.  
5.1 
Introduction
However, other things are of course not equal: in particular, the 
impact of unemployment, lone parenthood, age etc. on income and 
the probability of being on “low” income depend crucially on the 
extent and nature of social protection in the country in question. It is 
thus on the social protection system, and the welfare state more 
broadly, that discussion of cross-country differences in low income 
and poverty is most often focused. In the next chapter we undertake 
an in-depth investigation of the role of social security systems in 
explaining inter-country differences in relative income poverty. In 
this chapter, however, we focus on differences in macroeconomic 
and labour market situations, demographic profiles and household 
structures. Each of these could, potentially, play a significant role in 
explaining cross-country differences in relative income poverty.  
In order to explore this in some depth, we will focus on a sub-set 
of EU countries, comparing Ireland with the Netherlands, Germany, 
21 
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Portugal, and the UK. The mix of similarities and differences 
between these countries – in terms of structures and policies  –  
make them a particularly useful set for this purpose. The UK has a 
tax and social protection structure very like Ireland’s – often termed 
the Anglo-Saxon model and quite different to many other European 
Union countries. Germany and the Netherlands have quite low 
relative income poverty rates, though not the lowest in the EU, but 
there are some significant differences in institutions and structures 
between them. Portugal, on the other hand, has a poorly developed 
social protection system and particularly high levels of relative 
income poverty.  
 
 Comparative analysis of the harmonised household survey data for 
these countries from the European Community Household Panel 
survey allows us to explore the significance of structural differences 
in the labour market, demographic profile and household 
composition for the extent of relative income poverty. The method 
we employ for this analysis is, in essence, straightforward. We ask, in 
effect, what the relative income poverty rate in these countries would 
be if they all had the same unemployment rate, or the same age 
structure, or the same household structure, and nothing else 
changed. To derive those results, we simply reweight the actual 
survey data to shrink or expand the size of the group in question, 
without changing any of their circumstances or the situation of the 
rest of the sample – most importantly, their incomes. 
5.2 
Methods of 
Analysis
To take an example, suppose the unemployment rate in Ireland is 
10 per cent but in the Netherlands it is 5 per cent? We want to see 
how much difference this makes to relative income poverty, so we 
want to produce a “counterfactual” distribution for Ireland as if 
unemployment was actually 5 per cent. To do so, we reweight the 
unemployed in the Irish sample so that there are only half as many – 
while leaving the profile of those unemployed in terms of income, 
household size and composition etc. unchanged. We then recompute 
the relative income poverty threshold, and then look at the numbers 
falling below that threshold for the counterfactual Irish sample.  
Note that this is not the same as a much simpler exercise that 
could be carried out without recourse to micro-data, focused on the 
percentage below an unchanging relative income threshold. Suppose, 
for example, that the elderly comprise 20 per cent of the population 
and 25 per cent of that group fall below 60 per cent of median 
income, whereas the remaining 80 per cent of the population has 
only 10 per cent below that threshold. The overall relative income 
poverty rate would then be (20%x0.25) + (80%x0.10) = 13 per cent. 
Now imagine a counterfactual situation where the elderly comprise 
only 10 per cent of the population. We could of course simply 
recalculate the relative income poverty rate as (10*0.25) + (90*0.10) 
= 11.5 per cent. We cannot, however, safely conclude on that basis 
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that the alternative demographic profile would be associated, ceteris 
paribus, with a relative income poverty rate 1.5 per cent lower.  
Such a calculation does indeed give some indication of the scale 
of the potential impact of this difference in demographic profile. 
What it does not take into account is that in actually making 
comparisons across countries (or over time), the relative income 
threshold itself will depend inter alia on the demographic structure. 
In this example, if there were only half as many elderly, then median 
income and thus the relative income threshold, might well be higher 
– so that the relative income poverty rates for each of the groups 
based on this higher threshold would be higher. This could serve to 
offset the impact of reducing the size of the high-risk group, and 
thus affect one’s overall assessment of the role of such demographic 
factors in explaining differences across countries. It is therefore 
important to be able to simulate the alternative demographic or 
other structures using the micro-data, which allows us to re-compute 
the poverty threshold – as some of the results presented in the next 
section amply demonstrate. 
We now apply this simulation approach to the sub-set of five 
countries, focusing in turn on demographic profile, labour market 
situation, and household composition. In doing so, we take the 
Netherlands as our benchmark case – the country with the lowest 
relative income poverty rate of the 5 considered here, and one of the 
lowest in the EU. In other words, the question posed is “what would 
the relative income poverty rate be in the other countries if they had 
the Netherlands’ demographic profile, unemployment rate, or 
household composition structure”? For simplicity, we focus on the 
characteristics of the household and the “household reference 
person” – defined by Eurostat for the purposes of the ECHP as the 
owner or tenant of the household’s accommodation or, if a couple 
are jointly responsible, the older of the two. Thus we look at the age 
profile and labour market situation of the household reference 
person (rather than all adults in the household) and the number of 
adults and children in the household, how households vary in these 
terms across countries, and the role these differences might play in 
cross-country variation in relative income poverty among 
households. The household is thus the unit of analysis, and the 
relative income poverty rates presented in this section refer to 
households below 60 per cent of median equivalised household 
income (rather than to persons on the basis of their equivalised 
household income, as is the case in Tables 3.1-3.3 above).  
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 We begin by focusing on the possible role of differences across 
the countries in age profile. Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of the 
ECHP samples for Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and 
Portugal in terms of the age range into which the household 
reference person falls.  
5.3 
Simulating the 
Impact of 
Demographic 
Profile We see that there are indeed some differences in age profile on 
this basis, although they are not very pronounced. In Germany, the 
UK and Portugal about 18 per cent of sample households are 
headed by someone aged 65 years or over, compared with 14-15 per 
cent in Ireland and the Netherlands. Ireland has a particularly high 
proportion in the 45-54 year age range, and fewer in the youngest 
age category. 
Table 5.1: Composition of Sample Households by Age of Household Reference Person, 
Selected Countries, ECHP 
Age Range Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent of Sample Households 
Under 35 years 17.4 21.9 19.3 20.3 18.2 
35-44    “ 27.9 28.0 26.0 24.5 24.0 
45-54    “ 24.8 22.8 20.0 23.0 23.0 
55-64    “ 15.4 12.5 17.4 14.4 16.9 
65 years and over  14.5 14.8 17.3 17.8 17.9 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 
To know whether these differences in age profile could have a 
significant impact on relative income poverty, the first thing we need 
to know is whether relative income poverty rates actually vary much 
across age groups, and if so whether this is in a systematic way 
across countries. Table 5.2 shows how the percentage falling below 
the 60 per cent of median income threshold varies across these age 
categories in each of the countries. Note first that the relative 
income poverty rates for the overall samples differ from those 
reported in Table 3.1, although both are derived from the ECHP; 
this is primarily because the figures in Table 5.1 refer to households, 
whereas those in Table 3.1 referred to persons. (The ECHP dataset 
has also been revised since the Joint Report was completed, and we 
are using the revised set.) 
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Table 5.2: Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold by Age of Household Reference 
Person, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Age Range Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Percentage Falling Below 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
Under 35 years 19.0 19.8 16.4 21.5 14.5 
35-44    “ 24.3 11.0 15.8 21.5 22.3 
45-54    “ 22.3 10.6 8.7 8.7 18.2 
55-64    “ 10.7 8.0 11.0 8.2 21.4 
65 years and over  16.6 8.0 16.5 25.0 34.3 
      
All 19.8 12.2 13.9 17.3 21.9 
 
We then see that the relative income poverty rate for households 
headed by an elderly person is above average in Germany, and well 
above average in the UK and Portugal. In Ireland and the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, this is not the case: households with 
an elderly head have below-average rates.13 In the Netherlands it is 
households headed by someone under 35 years that have the highest 
proportion below the 60 per cent threshold, whereas in Ireland it is 
households headed by someone in the 35-54 year age ranges.  
While there is not a consistent pattern across countries in the way 
relative income poverty rates vary across the age range, the fact that 
there is significant variation does mean that differences in age profile 
could play a role in the overall extent of relative income poverty. To 
assess this, we carry out the simulation exercise described earlier, 
where we reweight the samples for Ireland, Germany, the UK and 
Portugal so that they have the same age profile – the same 
proportion of households in each of the age ranges in Table 5.1 – as 
the Netherlands. We then recompute median income in each sample, 
derive the 60 per cent income threshold from that new median, and 
see how many of the households in the reweighted samples fall 
below that threshold. The results are shown in Table 5.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 This may appear surprising in the Irish case, since recent studies have shown the 
elderly to have particularly high relative income poverty rates (Layte et al., 2001, 
Nolan et al., 2002). However, risks of relative income poverty increased sharply for 
the elderly in the late 1990s as pensions lagged behind very rapid increases in 
incomes from work, whereas the data from the ECHP being analysed here relates 
to incomes in the year 1996. In addition, using the household rather than the 
person as unit of analysis results in lower relative income poverty rates for the 
elderly.  
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Table 5.3: Actual and Simulated Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold When Age 
Profile Is Standardised, Selected Countries, ECHP 
 Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
Per Cent of Households 
below 60 per cent of 
Median Income 
     
Actual 19.8 12.2 13.9 17.3 21.9 
Simulated 19.8 12.2 13.8 17.4 21.7 
Per Cent of Households 
below 50 per cent of 
Median Income 
     
Actual 8.6 7.6 8.0 11.1 15.4 
Simulated 8.4 7.6 7.8 11.4 15.3 
 
Comparing simulated with actual results, we see that the number 
of households falling below the 60 per cent of median threshold are 
virtually unchanged for Ireland, Germany, the UK and Portugal. 
(The figures for the Netherlands are of course identical.) For 
comparative purposes the percentage below the 50 per cent of 
median income threshold are also shown, and there is again little 
difference between the actual and simulated relative income poverty 
rates. In the case of Ireland this is not very surprising, since the age 
profile – as shown in Table 5.1 – is not in fact very different to that 
in the Netherlands as imposed in the simulation. For the other 
countries, though, the age profile is somewhat different but the 
impact of standardising to the Dutch structure has a mix of effects 
which tend to balance out in terms of the overall relative income 
poverty rate.  
This comes about due to two distinct factors. For Germany and 
the UK, we can see from Table 5.1 that the impact of 
standardisation to the Dutch age distribution is to reduce the 
proportion of elderly, and Table 5.2 shows that to be a high-poverty 
group in both those countries. However, the impact is to increase 
the proportion of households headed by someone under 45 years, 
which turns out to be another high-poverty group, while reducing 
the proportion in the 55-64 year age range which is a low-risk group. 
In these two countries the age-group-specific relative income 
poverty rates are essentially unchanged by the simulation, with the 
median in the simulated distribution being very close to the actual 
one.  
For Portugal, the story is a little more complicated. The impact of 
standardising to the Dutch structure is again to reduce the 
proportion of elderly, again a high-poverty group. This is balanced 
by an increase in the proportion headed by someone aged 35-44 
years, a group with a much lower risk. This in itself would reduce the 
overall poverty rate – although only by about half a percentage point. 
The simulated distribution in this case has a higher median income, 
though, precisely because it has reduced the size of a low-income 
group and increased the size of a higher-income one. This means 
that for some of the age groups – notably those aged under 45 or 65  
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years or over – the proportion falling below the income threshold 
actually rises. This works to offset the impact one would have seen 
with an unchanged income threshold, leaving the overall poverty rate 
only very slightly down. 
These results demonstrate the complexity of the relationship 
between the composition of the population and the relative income 
poverty rate, a pattern which will be repeated when we turn to 
characteristics other than the age profile. They show that the fact 
that one country has a higher proportion of its population in a 
particular high poverty risk group than another does not necessarily 
produce or explain a gap between their overall poverty rates. What it 
can still do, however, is help to explain why the profile of those 
below a relative income threshold differs between the countries. 
Thus Table 5.4 shows the composition, in terms of age of the 
reference person, of the households below the 60 per cent of median 
threshold in the actual and simulated samples we have just been 
discussing. We see that standardising to the Dutch age profile, 
although leaving the overall relative income poverty rate unchanged, 
does reduce the importance of the elderly among those below the 
threshold in Germany, the UK and Portugal. This gives an indication 
of the role of differences in the age profile – as opposed to cross-
country differences in age-specific income poverty rates – in 
producing differences in the age profile of the group below the 
threshold. Since composition as well as the overall size of the group 
below the threshold clearly matters in designing a policy response 
this is relevant, but in terms of the focus of the present study on the 
variation in the overall relative income poverty rate across countries 
it is of secondary importance.  
Table 5.4: Composition of Actual and Simulated Households Below Relative Income 
Threshold by Age of Household Reference Person, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Age Range Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent of the Households Below 60 Per Cent Median Threshold: Actual 
Under 35 years 16.8 35.7 22.9 25.3 12.1 
35-44    “ 34.5 25.8 29.9 30.5 24.5 
45-54    “ 28.2 20.3 12.7 11.6 19.1 
55-64    “ 8.3 8.1 13.8 6.9 16.5 
65 years and over  12.2 10.0 20.6 25.7 27.9 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 Per Cent of the Households Below 60 Per Cent Median Threshold: Simulated 
Under 35 years 20.9 35.7 25.7 26.9 14.8 
35-44    “ 34.3 25.8 32.3 34.5 29.6 
45-54    “ 25.7 20.3 14.5 11.4 19.1 
55-64    “ 6.7 8.1 10.0 5.9 12.3 
65 years and over  12.4 10.0 17.6 21.2 24.1 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
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 We now turn to the role of differences across the countries in 
labour force status, where we want to take into account not only 
differences in the level of unemployment but also inactivity. Table 
5.5 shows the breakdown of the ECHP samples for Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Portugal in terms of the labour 
force status of the household reference person at the time of the 
survey.  
5.4 
Simulating the 
Role of Labour 
Force Status
Table 5.5: Composition of Sample Households by Labour Force Status of Household 
Reference Person, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Labour Force 
Status 
Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent of Sample Households 
Employee 40.6 61.7 58.2 47.1 46.1 
Self-employed 18.3 5.8 6.0 15.7 21.0 
Unemployed 13.7 5.6 4.9 4.9 4.4 
Inactive 27.4 26.9 30.8 32.4 28.5 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The table shows that there are considerable differences in the 
composition of the samples in terms of labour force status. Taking 
employees and the self-employed together, the percentage of 
household “heads” in work is 67-68 per cent in the Netherlands and 
Portugal, 63-64 per cent in Germany and the UK, and 59 per cent in 
Ireland. Within this, however, the proportion in self-employment 
ranges from only 6 per cent in the Netherlands and Germany up to 
16-18 per cent in Ireland and the UK and 21 per cent in Portugal. 
Among those not at work, the percentage inactive is in the range 27-
32 per cent across the five countries, but the percentage unemployed 
is much higher in Ireland than in the other four countries. (This Irish 
figure clearly pre-dates the period when unemployment fell 
dramatically; the results of simulating a much lower level of 
unemployment and its impact on the relative income poverty rate are 
still of considerable interest.) 
We now look at how relative income poverty rates vary across 
these groups, in Table 5.6. We see that the relative income poverty 
rate for households headed by an employee is much lower than for 
other groups in each country, in the 6-8 per cent range except for 
Portugal where it is 11 per cent. The proportion of households 
headed by a self-employed person below the threshold is 
consistently a good deal higher, at about 15 per cent in Germany, 
Ireland and the UK but as high as 26 per cent in the Netherlands 
and 32 per cent in Portugal. This means that in the Netherlands the 
relative income poverty rate for such households is considerably 
higher than for those where the household reference person is 
inactive – i.e. retired, not working due to illness or disability, or 
working full-time in the home. In Portugal these two groups have 
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the same relative income poverty rate, whereas in Germany, Ireland 
and the UK the inactive have a much higher proportion below the 
threshold than the self-employed. Households where the reference 
person is unemployed rather than inactive have a much higher 
relative income poverty rate than others in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and the UK, though in Portugal their poverty 
rate is below average.  
Table 5.6: Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold by Labour Force Status of Household 
Reference Person, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Labour Force 
Status 
Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent Falling Below 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
Employee 5.5 6.4 7.7 6.3 10.9 
Self-employed 15.6 25.8 15.4 16.9 32.4 
Unemployed 53.7 39.9 42.6 60.6 17.2 
Inactive 26.4 16.2 20.3 27.0 32.9 
      
All 19.8 12.2 13.9 17.3 21.9 
 
To assess the role that differences in composition in terms of 
labour force status could play in the variation in relative income 
poverty rates across the countries, we again carry out the simulation 
exercise. This now reweights the samples for Ireland, Germany, the 
UK and Portugal so that they have the same proportion of 
households as the Netherlands in each of the labour force status 
categories in Table 5.5. The overall percentages falling below the 60 
per cent and 50 per cent relative income thresholds in the simulated 
samples are compared with those in the actual samples in Table 5.7. 
Comparing simulated with actual results, the number of households 
falling below the 60 per cent of median threshold are virtually 
unchanged for Ireland, slightly down for Germany, down a little 
more for the UK, and almost 1 percentage point lower for Portugal. 
When we look at the 50 per cent of median threshold, on the other 
hand, the impact is to increase the numbers below the threshold in 
the case of Ireland, while reducing the relative income poverty rate 
in Portugal by almost 2 percentage points. 
Table 5.7: Actual and Simulated Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold When Labour 
Force Status is Standardised, Selected Countries, ECHP 
 Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
Per Cent of Households Below 60 
Per Cent of Median Income 
     
Actual 19.8 12.2 13.9 17.3 21.9 
Simulated 19.9 12.2 13.7 17.7 21.0 
Per Cent of Households Below 60 
Per Cent of Median Income 
     
Actual 8.6 7.6 8.0 11.1 15.4 
Simulated 10.2 7.6 7.6 11.3 13.6 
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The impact of the standardisation to the Dutch labour force 
structure in the Irish case is to significantly reduce the proportion of 
households headed by an unemployed person, the group with by far 
the highest poverty risk, as well as the proportion self-employed, and 
to increase by fully 20 percentage points the proportion headed by 
an employee, the group with by far the lowest poverty risk. Why 
then does this not reduce the overall relative income poverty rate at 
the 60 per cent threshold, and actually increase it with the lower, 50 
per cent threshold? Is this not entirely counter-intuitive and 
implausible? 
The answer is once again to be found in the fact that median 
income, on which the poverty threshold is based, is also affected. 
Suppose we simply changed the size of the groups (in terms of 
labour force status) to the Dutch structure and apply Ireland’s 
group-specific relative income poverty rates as shown in Table 5.6. 
The result would indeed be a very substantial fall in the overall 
numbers below the 60 per cent threshold – from 20 per cent to 
below 15 per cent. However, substantially increasing the proportion 
in employment raises median income significantly. The result is that 
the group-specific income poverty rates do not remain unchanged: 
instead, they rise to well above those in the actual sample, as shown 
in Table 5.8. The proportion of households headed by an employee 
falling below the threshold rises from about 6 per cent to almost 9 
per cent, and since this is now by far the biggest group their 
increasing poverty risk has a substantial impact on the overall 
poverty rate. 
Table 5.8: Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold by Labour Force Status of House- 
hold Reference Person, Actual and Simulated Samples, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Labour Force 
Status 
Ireland Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent Below 60 Per Cent of  Median Income 
 Actual Simul-
ated 
Actual Simul-
ated 
Actual Simul-
ated 
Actual Simul-
ated 
Employee 5.5 8.6 7.7 8.0 6.3 7.8 10.9 12.0 
Self-employed 15.6 23.5 15.4 15.4 16.9 17.7 32.4 34.2 
Unemployed 53.7 64.7 42.6 43.0 60.6 65.2 17.2 31.6 
Inactive 26.4 35.8 20.3 20.4 27.0 30.5 32.9 36.6 
 
These results demonstrate that the relationship between the 
composition of the population and the relative income poverty rate 
is indeed a complex one, precisely because the location of the 
income threshold against which poverty is being assessed itself 
depends inter alia on that composition. Table 5.8 shows the group-
specific relative income poverty rates being little affected by the 
simulation in the case of Germany, which has a labour force 
composition quite similar to the Netherlands. These rates increase 
for the UK and Portugal, though a good deal less than in Ireland, 
and this underlies the minimal change in the overall numbers falling 
below the 60 per cent relative income threshold in those countries. 
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In the Irish case, precisely because the simulation entails such a large 
increase in the proportion of households headed by an employee, the 
increase in median income is enough to produce quite a marked rise 
in the percentage of households falling below the 50 per cent of 
median threshold.  
It is important to be clear about the nature of the assumptions 
implicit in the simulation exercise. In the Irish case, we are shrinking 
the size of the group headed by an unemployed or self-employed 
person and increasing the size of the group headed by an employee, 
but leaving the characteristics of each of those groups – including 
most importantly the distribution of income within each – 
unchanged. It could be argued that this is biasing the results because 
it does not reflect what would actually happen if a significant 
number of the unemployed were brought into employment. Those 
moving from unemployment into employment are much less likely 
to command the median wage than those currently in employment. 
This means that shrinking the size of the unemployed group might 
not in fact increase the overall median income by as much as the 
simulation assumes – because it assumes that they have the same 
distribution of earnings as the already employed. This means that the 
group-specific relative income poverty rates might not rise by as 
much as the simulation suggests, and thus we might see more impact 
on the overall income poverty rate.  
This is worth keeping in mind, but one must also be clear about 
the nature of the exercise. We are comparing countries with rather 
different structures in terms of the labour force, demography and 
household structures, and asking to what extent these differences 
serve to explain the variation in relative income poverty rates. We do 
not know what the profile of income among households headed by 
an employee would be if the size of that group was substantially 
increased, since that profile would depend on how this was achieved. 
It could be done by creating low-skilled and low-paid jobs, or by up-
skilling the workforce and creating high-skilled and highly-paid jobs, 
or by some combination of the two. Simply thinking about the types 
of jobs that the currently unemployed might move into is too 
restrictive an approach: instead, we have to think about what the 
overall distribution of earnings and income might look like in a 
situation where the numbers at work were substantially increased. 
While that depends on how this increase comes about, the 
assumption implicit in the simulation that the distribution among 
current employees is simply “scaled up” is not inherently 
unreasonable.  
This may indeed be borne out by recent Irish experience. Over 
the second half of the 1990s, unemployment declined sharply and 
the numbers in work expanded even more rapidly. This did not lead 
to a decline in the numbers falling below relative income poverty 
thresholds – indeed, there was generally some increase, as seen in 
recent ESRI studies (Layte et al., 2001, Nolan et al., 2002). A variety 
of factors were at work in producing this result, most importantly 
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the fact that social welfare support rates did not keep up with mean 
or median incomes. However, the point to bring out here is that the 
increasing size of the “at work” group was not brought about simply 
by moving unemployed people into low-skilled jobs, but by an 
expansion in jobs throughout the range. This played its part in the 
rapid increase in median income, which in turn lead to increasing 
numbers below relative income thresholds despite shrinkage of the 
high-risk unemployed group. 
Rather similar results were obtained by Feres et al. (2002), who 
examined the impact on relative income poverty of the converse 
counterfactual, an increase in unemployment, for a number of 
European countries. This can be seen as indicating that the result is 
not due to any peculiarities in the Irish situation, but is of more 
general relevance. 
We saw for age composition that the simulations may have a 
more substantial impact on the profile of those below relative 
income thresholds than on the overall numbers falling below them, 
and we now explore this in simulating the Dutch labour force status. 
Table 5.9 shows the composition, in terms of labour force status of 
the reference person, of the households below the 60 per cent of 
median threshold in the actual and simulated samples.  
Table 5.9: Composition of Actual and Simulated Households Below Relative Income 
Threshold by Labour Force Status of Household Reference Person, Selected 
Countries, ECHP 
Age Range Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent of the Households Below 60 Per Cent Median Threshold: Actual 
Employee 11.4 33.1 32.7 17.1 23.0 
Self-employed 14.5 12.4 6.7 15.3 30.9 
Unemployed 37.4 18.4 15.4 17.1 3.4 
Inactive 36.7 36.0 45.2 50.4 42.7 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 Per Cent of the Households Below 60 Per Cent Median Threshold: Simulated 
Employee 26.7 33.1 36.2 27.2 35.5 
Self-employed 6.9 12.4 6.5 5.8 9.4 
Unemployed 18.2 18.4 17.5 20.6 8.3 
Inactive 48.3 36.0 39.7 46.4 46.8 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 
We see that standardising to the Dutch labour force status 
structure does significantly alter the profile of those below the 
threshold in the UK and Portugal, and has an even greater impact 
for Ireland. In the Irish case, the proportion of those below the 
threshold headed by an employee goes up from 11 per cent to 27 per 
cent, with the proportion headed by an unemployed person falling 
from 37 per cent to 18 per cent. There is also a marked decline in 
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the proportion headed by a self-employed person (which includes 
farmers), and a corresponding increase in the proportion headed by 
someone who is not active in the labour market. This latter result is 
worth noting because standardising to the Dutch labour force 
pattern does not actually change the proportion of Irish households 
headed by someone who is inactive (as Table 5.6 shows). Instead, it 
is once again the increase in the relative income poverty risk for this 
group, which was particularly marked (Table 5.8), which is increasing 
their importance among those below the threshold. 
 
 We now focus on the role of differences across the countries in 
household composition type. Here, we will be particularly interested 
in differences across countries in the importance of single-parent 
households, in the proportion of adults living alone, and in family 
size. Do such differences contribute substantially to the variation 
across these countries in relative income poverty rates? Table 5.10 
shows the breakdown of the ECHP samples for Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Portugal in terms of the 
household composition distinguishing seven household types.  
5.5 
Simulating the 
Role of 
Household 
Composition
Table 5.10: Composition of Sample Households by Household Composition Type, Selected 
Countries, ECHP 
Household Type Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent of Sample Households 
Single 7.0 14.3 15.5 11.0 4.6 
Couple 13.7 29.5 27.2 25.5 15.5 
Couple 1 child 7.9 9.0 12.4 8.9 13.9 
Couple 2 children 14.2 18.7 14.9 14.1 17.6 
Couple 3 + children 17.4 10.8 6.5 9.8 5.8 
Single parent 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.8 2.4 
Other 36.7 14.6 20.4 26.8 40.1 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The table shows Ireland and Portugal to be distinctive in having a 
relatively small proportion of all households being single adult or 
two-adult only households – whereas those proportions are much 
higher in the Netherlands and Germany in particular. Ireland is also 
distinctive in having by far the highest proportion of households 
comprising a couple and three or more children. All of the countries 
have quite high proportions in what we have categorised as “other”, 
which comprises households with a single person or couple and at 
least one other adult – a rather heterogeneous group. The proportion 
of households consisting of a single adult with dependent children 
(under age 18) is in fact quite low in all the countries and varies 
rather little. 
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We now look at how relative income poverty rates vary across 
these groups, in Table 5.11. We see that the relative income poverty 
rate for single-adult households is above the average in each country, 
and so is the rate for couples with three or more children – 
particularly in the UK and Portugal. The rate for single-parent 
households is even higher except in Portugal, where it is nonetheless 
well above average.  
Table 5.11: Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold by Household Composition Type, 
Selected Countries, ECHP 
Household Type Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent Falling Below 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
Single 36.3 18.8 20.7 24.9 47.2 
Couple 8.0 6.2 8.5 11.2 27.9 
Couple 1 child 11.0 9.5 8.4 11.1 15.9 
Couple,2 children 16.0 9.2 9.2 14.6 15.9 
Couple 3 + children 33.0 17.5 31.4 41.7 40.5 
Single parent 51.9 45.0 52.0 46.1 32.7 
Other 15.3 12.3 11.5 9.9 18.2 
      
All 19.8 12.2 13.9 17.3 21.9 
 
We now carry out the simulation exercise once again, this time 
reweighting the samples for Ireland, Germany, the UK and Portugal 
so that they have the same proportion of households as the 
Netherlands in each of the household type in Table 5.11. The overall 
percentages falling below the 60 per cent and 50 per cent relative 
income thresholds in the simulated samples are compared with those 
in the actual samples in Table 5.12. The number of households 
falling below the 60 per cent of median threshold now rise as a 
results of the standardisation by 2 percentage points for both Ireland 
and Portugal, and by less than 1 percentage point for the UK, with 
little change for Germany. Looking at the 50 per cent of median 
threshold, the percentage below the threshold again increases 
markedly in the case of Ireland, less so for Portugal, and hardly at all 
for the UK. 
Table 5.12: Actual and Simulated Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold When House-
hold Composition Type is Standardised, Selected Countries, ECHP 
 Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
Per Cent of Households Below 60 Per 
Cent of Median Income 
     
Actual 19.8 12.2 13.9 17.3 21.9 
Simulated 21.9 12.2 13.7 18.0 23.8 
Per cent of Households Below 50 Per 
Cent of Median Income 
     
Actual 8.6 7.6 8.0 11.1 15.4 
Simulated 10.4 7.6 8.0 11.3 16.5 
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Standardising to the Dutch household type structure has the 
effect, in the Irish case, of increasing very substantially the 
proportion of single-adult and two-adult only households, while 
reducing the proportion consisting of couples with 3 or more 
children and in the “other” category. This entails increasing the size 
of a group with an above-average risk of falling below the 60 per 
cent threshold – namely single adult households – but also one with 
a very low risk – namely two-adult only households. 
Correspondingly, it has the effect of reducing the size of a high-risk 
group – couples with 3 or more children – but also a low-risk one – 
the “other” category.  
This means that impact on median income again becomes crucial. 
We see from Table 5.13 that for Ireland the risk of falling below the 
60 per cent threshold is substantially higher for certain groups in the 
simulated than the actual sample. This is particularly the case for 
single adult households and for couples with 3 or more children and 
“other”. This increase in group-specific risk – reflecting an increase 
in median income – is once again the crucial ingredient in the overall 
rise in numbers falling below the threshold. Such an increase is not 
seen for the other countries – in the UK there is no change in those 
rates, and in Germany they actually fall slightly. So it is the particular 
impact of standardising to the Dutch household type structure in the 
Irish case in increasing the overall median that produces the marked 
increase in risk for certain groups. 
Table 5.13: Percentage Below Relative Income Threshold by Household Composition Type, 
 Actual and Simulated Samples, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Household 
Type Ireland Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent Below 60 Per Cent of Median Income 
 Actual Simul-ated Actual 
Simul-
ated Actual 
Simul-
ated Actual 
Simul-
ated 
Single 36.3 44.6 20.7 19.2 24.9 24.9 47.2 42.7 
Couple 8.0 9.1 8.5 8.0 11.2 11.2 27.9 23.7 
Couple 1 child 11.0 12.8 8.4 7.8 11.1 11.1 15.9 12.3 
Couple 2 
children 16.0 18.5 9.2 8.4 14.6 14.6 15.9 13.0 
Couple 3 + 
children 33.0 37.1 31.4 31.0 41.7 41.7 40.5 38.1 
Single parent 51.9 57.7 52.0 51.2 46.1 46.1 32.7 27.0 
Other 15.3 16.4 11.5 9.4 9.9 9.9 18.2 15.6 
 
Finally, we look at the impact of the simulation on the profile of 
those below relative income thresholds. Table 5.14 shows the 
breakdown in terms of household composition type of the 
households below the 60 per cent of median threshold in the actual 
and simulated samples. We see that standardising to the Dutch 
household composition structure has a marked effect on the profile 
of those below the threshold in the Irish case. Households 
comprising a single adult or couple constitute 41 per cent of those 
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below the threshold in the simulated sample, compared with only 16 
per cent in the actual one. Households in the “other” category – 
various types of multi-adult household – by contrast comprise 28 per 
cent of those below the threshold in the actual sample compared 
with only 11 per cent in the simulated one. There are also substantial 
effects on composition for Portugal, and less pronounced but still 
significant ones for the UK. 
Table 5.14: Composition of Actual and Simulated Households Below Relative Income Thres-
hold by Household Composition Type, Selected Countries, ECHP 
Household Type Ireland Netherlands Germany UK Portugal 
 Per Cent of the Households Below 60 Per Cent Median Threshold: Actual 
Single 12.9 22.1 23.0 15.9 9.6 
Couple 5.6 15.0 16.6 16.7 19.7 
Couple 1 child 4.4 7.0 7.6 5.7 10.0 
Couple 2 children 11.5 14.0 10.0 12.0 12.9 
Couple 3 + children 29.3 15.5 14.7 23.9 10.8 
Single parent 8.2 11.8 11.3 10.3 3.7 
Other 28.2 14.6 16.8 15.5 33.3 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 Per Cent of the Households Below 60 Per Cent Median Threshold: Simulated 
Single 29.2 22.1 20.0 19.7 25.0 
Couple 12.2 15.0 17.1 18.4 29.3 
Couple 1 child 5.3 7.0 5.1 5.6 4.8 
Couple 2 children 15.8 14.0 11.5 15.2 10.3 
Couple 3 + children 18.4 15.5 24.6 25.1 17.4 
Single parent 8.3 11.8 11.8 8.0 3.6 
Other 10.8 14.6 9.9 8.0 9.6 
      
All 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 An overall conclusion from the three simulation exercises is that 
differences in age profiles, patterns of labour force participation, and 
household composition across the countries we have examined do 
not in themselves appear to play the major role in explaining the 
substantial variation observed in relative income poverty rates. Thus 
for Ireland, with 20 per cent of households below 60 per cent of 
median equivalised income compared with only 12 per cent in the 
Netherlands, simulating the impact of imposing the Dutch age, 
labour force or household composition structures did not close that 
gap – indeed it sometimes widened it. This reflects, among other 
things, a fundamental and often under-appreciated feature of relative 
income thresholds themselves: in effect, reducing the proportion in 
high-poverty-risk groups does not necessarily reduce the overall 
poverty rate with such thresholds, because the standard against 
5.6 
Conclusions
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which poverty is being assessed is also affected. The simulations thus 
displayed a much stronger influence of imposing the Dutch 
structures on the composition of the group found below relative 
income thresholds than on the size of that group. This is still very 
important for understanding the factors producing poverty and 
designing strategic responses, but it does not explain very much of 
the persistent gap that is observed between relative income poverty 
rates in the countries concerned. 
This result need not necessarily hold if the set of countries 
studied were expanded or changed, but it is worth noting that it is 
entirely consistent with the results from a similar exercise carried out 
with data from the Luxembourg Income study. Rainwater and 
Smeeding (1997) employ a similar simulation method based on 
reweighting the survey samples, covering the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, Australia and the USA. In 
brief, they conclude that social protection and the way household 
income is built up or “packaged” have far stronger effects on 
poverty (and income inequality) than demographic factors such as 
age or household composition. Focusing on the Netherlands, they 
conclude that:  
It is the Dutch income package, not its demography, which produces low rates 
of poverty. 
This provides some reinforcement for the results we have 
presented here, and like them points us towards social protection as 
a key factor in cross-country differences in relative income poverty 
rates. In the next chapter we go on to examine the role of social 
protection, including an analysis of the impact of differences in 
social protection structures and levels of support via tax-benefit 
models. 
 
6. SOCIAL PROTECTION 
SYSTEMS AND RELATIVE 
INCOME POVERTY 
In this chapter we undertake an in-depth examination of the role of 
social protection. We begin (Section 6.2) by looking at overall levels 
of social protection spending in Ireland compared with other EU 
member states and how this has been evolving. For this purpose we 
draw on data produced and harmonised by Eurostat, calculated in 
accordance with the revised methodology for the European System 
of Integrated Social Protection Statistics, or ESSPROS. Section 6.3 
undertakes a more detailed comparison between Ireland’s 
expenditure on social welfare and that of selected EU countries, 
particularly those with the lowest poverty rates. In Section 6.4 the 
central question is  “what might be the impact on relative income 
poverty if Irish social welfare rates were similar, relative to average 
incomes, to those in Denmark, and taxes were correspondingly 
higher?” We use the SWITCH tax-benefit model to explore the first-
round or “cash” impact on relative income poverty14
6.1 
 Introduction
 
 Table 6.1 shows the level of social protection expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP in each of the 15 “old” member states of the EU 
and how it evolved over the 1990s. At the beginning of the 1990s 
Ireland was spending about 18 per cent of GDP on social 
protection, while the EU-15 average was 26 per cent. The 
proportion of GDP going on social protection in Ireland was thus 
72 per cent of the EU average, and Portugal was the lowest-spending 
country at 15 per cent of GDP.  
6.2 
Social 
Protection 
Expenditure: 
Ireland in an 
EU Context
By 2001, the average figure for the 15 member states was just 
under 28 per cent of GDP, and 11 out of the 15 countries were 
spending in the 25-31 per cent range. Spain, Luxembourg and 
Portugal were spending between 20 per cent and 24 per cent, but 
Ireland was by far the lowest at 15 per cent of GDP. 
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14 i.e., before any allowance is made for behavioural changes in response to changed 
financial incentives. 
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Table 6.1: Expenditure on Social Protection as Per Cent of GDP, EU Member States, 1990- 
1999 
 Social Protection as Per Cent of GDP 
 1990 1996 1999 2001 
Belgium 26.4 28.7 28.2 27.4 
Denmark 28.7 31.4 29.4 27.5 
Germany 25.4 30.0 29.6 29.8 
Greece 22.9 22.9 25.5 27.2 
Spain 19.9 21.8 20.0 20.1 
France 27.9 31.0 30.3 30.0 
Ireland 18.4 17.8 14.7 14.6 
Italy 24.7 24.8 25.3 25.6 
Luxembourg 22.1 24.0 21.9 21.2 
Netherlands 32.5 30.1 28.1 27.6 
Austria 26.7 29.6 28.6 28.4 
Portugal 15.2 21.3 22.9 23.9 
Finland 25.1 31.6 26.7 25.8 
Sweden 33.1 34.5 32.9 31.3 
UK 23.0 28.3 26.9 27.2 
EU-15 average 25.5 28.5 27.6 27.5 
Source: Abramovici (2002a, 2004). 
 
This means that part of the explanation for Ireland’s position as 
an outlier in terms of social protection spending is to be found in the 
way social protection spending evolved in the 1990s. This in essence 
reflects the very rapid growth in GDP, well above EU average 
growth rates, in the second half of the decade, and the impact of 
falling unemployment in reducing the demand for social protection. 
However, it is worth emphasising that even taking that into account, 
if we took the position before the economic boom as more typical 
Ireland would still be spending well below the EU average in terms 
of proportion of GDP.  
This brings us to the issue of whether GDP is the most 
appropriate point of comparison in this context. The gap between 
GDP and GNP is particularly wide in Ireland, because of our 
exceptional reliance on foreign direct investment and the consequent 
scale of profit repatriations abroad. GNP in 2001 was only about 84 
per cent of GDP – a gap which itself had widened over the course 
of the 1990s. However, taking social protection expenditure as a 
percentage of GNP rather than GDP would bring the Irish figure of 
14.6 per cent for 2001 shown in Table 6.1 up to only 17 per cent. 
This would still be lower than any other EU member state. 
It is worth looking at the composition of social protection 
spending in this context as well as its level. Table 6.2 shows that 
Ireland is again exceptional in those terms, with a much lower share 
of total social protection spending going on old age and survivor’s 
payments than any other member state. Only one-quarter of social 
protection spending in Ireland goes on old age and survivors 
payments, compared to an EU average of 46 per cent; the next-
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lowest country is Finland at 37 per cent. This is associated with the 
fact that only 11 per cent of the Irish population were aged 65 years 
or over, the lowest proportion of elderly in the EU and comparing 
with an EU average of 16 per cent.  
Table 6.2: Expenditure on Social Protection by Type, EU Member States, 2001 
 Old Age/ 
Survivors 
Sickness/ 
Health Care 
Disability Family/ 
Children 
Unemploy-
ment 
Housing/ 
Other 
 Per Cent of Total Social Spending 
Belgium 43.7 25.0 9.0 8.9 11.7 1.6 
Denmark 38.0 20.3 12.5 13.3 10.0 6.0 
Germany 42.4 28.8 7.7 10.4 8.2 2.5 
Greece 51.3 25.8 5.0 6.9 6.0 5.1 
Spain 45.3 30.0 7.6 2.6 12.9 1.7 
France 43.7 29.2 6.0 9.5 7.1 4.4 
IRELAND 24.8 43.4 5.2 12.5 8.3 5.8 
Italy 62.3 26.1 5.7 4.0 1.6 0.3 
Luxembourg 39.4 25.4 14.2 16.8 2.5 1.6 
Netherlands 41.8 30.4 11.6 4.4 5.0 6.8 
Austria 49.5 24.7 8.1 10.6 5.0 2.1 
Portugal 45.8 31.3 12.3 5.6 3.6 1.3 
Finland 36.6 24.5 13.7 12.1 9.8 3.3 
Sweden 39.1 29.2 12.4 9.6 5.6 4.3 
UK 46.5 28.1 9.4 6.8 2.9 6.3 
EU-15 average 46.0 28.2 8.0 8.0 6.2 3.6 
Source: Abramovici (2004). 
 
This means that less than 4 per cent of GDP was being spent on 
social protection for old age and survivors in Ireland, compared with 
an EU-15 average of about 13 per cent of GDP. Thus, the gap 
between Ireland and the EU average, in terms of spending on this 
group as a percentage of GDP, is a good deal wider than differences 
in the size of the group (crudely estimated on the basis of age alone) 
would imply. The average level of social protection spending per 
capita for the group must also be playing a significant role. This is 
accentuated by the fact that old age pensions actually comprise a 
relatively small proportion of this total in Ireland. Whereas about 
three-quarters of the “old age and survivors pensions” aggregate is 
made up of old age pensions on average across the EU members, in 
Ireland this figure is only 46 per cent. The structure of pension 
systems and the extent of reliance on the state versus occupational 
pensions in different countries clearly plays an important role, as 
argued for example in Lawlor and McCarthy (2003) and de Buitleir 
and McArdle (2003). However, the level of payment via social 
protection pensions to the elderly in Ireland is clearly low on a per 
capita basis. The trend over time is also instructive here. The 
percentage of GDP going on social protection pensions fell from 5.6 
per cent to 3.8 per cent over the 1990s in Ireland, when the EU 
average rose marginally from 12 per cent to 12.7 per cent.  
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This analysis of aggregate spending levels could usefully be 
pursued in greater depth. It also serves, however, as a backdrop to 
the direct examination of the role of social protection in the 
variation in relative income poverty rates across EU countries. In 
particular, we are interested in the salience of social protection in the 
pattern presented earlier whereby Ireland has a relatively high 
proportion falling below thresholds set at 60 per cent or 50 per cent 
of median equivalised income. The best way to investigate this 
relationship is via the use of tax-benefit models based on micro-data, 
and this will be the focus of the remainder of the study.  
 
 Thus far our inter-country comparisons have been at a highly 
aggregated level, such as comparisons of social security expenditure 
as a proportion of GNP. Inter-country differences at this level can 
arise from differences in demographic composition, differences in 
the population coverage of particular benefits in each country, and 
differences in benefit payment rates relative to average incomes in 
each country. In this section we move to more direct comparisons of 
welfare payment rates relative to average incomes. In particular we 
compare Irish welfare payment rates with those prevailing in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, countries with poverty rates among 
the lowest in the EU. These comparisons are greatly facilitated by 
country reports generated in the construction of EUROMOD, a tax-
benefit model for Europe (Sutherland, 2002; Hansen, 2002; de Vos, 
2002). The common year for policy comparisons in this version of 
EUROMOD was 1998, so it is to this year that policy comparisons 
and analysis in the remainder of this chapter refer. 
6.3 
Comparing 
Welfare Systems 
and Payment 
Rates: Ireland, 
Denmark and 
the Netherlands
The impact of welfare benefits on relative income poverty 
depends crucially on payment rates relative to the poverty line, which 
is in turn related to average incomes. For this reason, we consider 
payment rates in relation to average industrial earnings for each 
country.15
Before setting out detailed comparisons of payment rates for the 
main types of welfare beneficiary, it is worth considering some 
elements of the structure of welfare systems and payments which 
will influence these comparisons. Foremost among these, perhaps, is 
the distinction between social insurance and social assistance. A 
comparison might find similar rates of payment across countries for 
each individual social insurance and social assistance scheme. But if 
social insurance payments are higher than social assistance in both 
countries, and one country has a much higher proportion of its 
population covered by social insurance for contingencies such as 
illness, old age and unemployment, then average benefits paid in that 
15 Other measures of average income, disposable income per adult equivalent as 
used to anchor the relative income poverty lines, could also be used. We choose  
average industrial earnings because it is readily available, easily understood and 
widely used in international comparisons.  
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country will be higher. Thus, despite an equality between payment 
rates for each scheme, the system in one country may have a greater 
impact on poverty because a higher proportion of its population 
qualify for a higher rate of payment.  
Social security systems also differ in their treatment of couples. 
The Irish system includes payments in respect of a “qualified adult”, 
the spouse of a welfare beneficiary. This represents a continuation of 
the concept of an “adult dependant”. While this is strongly 
embodied in the Irish system, it is much less evident in Denmark or 
the Netherlands. There are some provisions (e.g., under the Danish 
social assistance scheme) for an additional payment in respect of a 
“stay-at-home” spouse. Typically, however, each adult is entitled to 
and expected to make an independent claim for a welfare payment 
based on circumstances such as illness or unemployment. This 
difference between the systems has potentially very strong 
implications for the impact of “importing” a Danish or Dutch-style 
social security policy into the Irish situation, in order to examine the 
impact on relative income poverty. We will discuss this in more 
detail in the next section. 
A third element of the structure of welfare payment rates is the 
level and structure of income support relating to children. Countries 
vary in the extent to which they use universal child benefit, child-
related payments with social insurance and/or social assistance 
benefits, in-work benefits for families with children, and tax-based 
supports such as child tax credits or earned income tax credit. In 
comparing Ireland with Denmark and the Netherlands the key 
elements are universal child benefit and “family allowances” which 
may be paid with the main social security benefits. In order to deal 
with differences in the policy mix, we consider rates of payment for 
universal child benefit and for “child dependant additions” (CDA)16 
in tandem. 
Table 6.3 below shows child benefit rates, which are 
differentiated by age in Denmark and the Netherlands, and 
combined rates of child benefit/CDA for minimum and maximum 
rates of CDA payment. All payment rates are expressed as 
proportions of national average industrial earnings. 
A number of features emerge from this analysis. First, as of 1998, 
Child Benefit rates in Ireland were similar to those payable in respect 
of young children in the Netherlands. They were somewhat below 
the rates paid in respect of older children in the Netherlands, and 
well below rates paid in respect of young children in Denmark. 
Combined child benefit/CDA rates in Ireland were reasonably close 
to the corresponding Danish rates, as a proportion of average 
earnings. Irish child benefit rates have been increased very 
substantially in recent years, so that by 2003 the ordinary rate of 
child benefit had reached 5.4 per cent of the average industrial wage 
16 We use the child dependant addition term, familiar in an Irish context, to cover 
similar systems  abroad, such as the Danish system of “family allowances”. 
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Table 6.3: Child Income Supports as Percentage of Average 
Industrial Earnings 
 Netherlands Denmark Ireland 
 Per Cent Per Cent Per Cent 
Child aged under 2 years Child Benefit 
 2.3 4.1 2.4 
3 to 5 years 2.3 3.7 2.4 
6 years 2.7 3.7 2.4 
7 to 11 years 2.7 2.9 2.4 
12 to 17 years 3.2 2.9 2.4 
18 years 0.0 0.0 2.4 
 Child Benefit and Maximum CDA 
Child aged under 2 years 2.3 9.1 7.5 
3 to 5 years 2.3 8.8 7.5 
6 years 2.7 8.8 7.5 
7 to 11 years 2.7 7.9 7.5 
12 to 17 years 3.2 7.9 7.5 
18 years 0.0 5.0 7.5 
 Child Benefit and Minimum CDA 
Child aged under 2 years 2.3 5.8 6.8 
3 to 5 years 2.3 5.5 6.8 
6 years 2.7 5.5 6.8 
7 to 11 years 2.7 4.6 6.8 
12 to 17 years 3.2 4.6 6.8 
18 years 0.0 1.7 6.8 
 
(up from 2.4 per cent in 1998). This compares with a maximum of  3 
to 4 per cent in the Dutch and Danish figures for 1998. It can be 
expected, therefore, that Irish child benefit rates have moved up in 
relation to rates in other European countries.  
Table 6.4 illustrates how payment rates (relative to average 
earnings) varied across countries for a single adult receiving different 
social security benefits. The comparison allows for a “maximum” 
and “minimum” rate of payment. In the Irish context, typically this 
involves a higher payment for contributory schemes. For Denmark, 
attaining the maximum payment depends instead on some 
categorical condition, while social assistance rates are shown 
separately. Payments might also be means tested but this is not 
considered here. One way of thinking about these comparisons is 
that they are for single adults with no other means: given the focus on 
poverty, we are particularly interested in comparing the amounts 
paid in different countries to welfare beneficiaries with no other 
means. 
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Table 6.4: Payment Rates in Relation to Average Earnings, Various Social Welfare Schemes: 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, 1998 
Single Adult Netherlands Denmark Ireland 
 Payment Rate as Per Cent of Average Earnings 
Pensioner — max 35.7 34.7 27.7 
 — min  34.7 24.2 
Widowed Pensioner — max 35.7 34.7 25.4 
 — min  34.7 24.2 
Widowed Non Pensioner — max 35.7 41.6 24.8 
 — min  31.3 23.6 
Unemployed — max 21.4 52.2 23.6 
 — min  42.8 22.9 
Ill/disabled  — max 21.4 54.9 24.1 
 — min  34.7 22.9 
Social assistance n.a. 31.3 22.9 
Social assistance lone parent n.a. 41.6 23.6 
 
Irish pension rates (including those for widowed pensioners) 
stood at between 24 and 28 per cent of average earnings in 1998, but 
Danish and Dutch rates were about one-quarter higher, at 35 per 
cent of average earnings. For widowed non-pensioners the gap was 
if anything somewhat greater, with Irish rates at about 24 to 25 per 
cent of average earnings, while rates in Denmark and the 
Netherlands were in the region of 30 to 40 per cent. 
Irish and Dutch payment rates for the unemployed were in the 
region of 21 to 24 per cent of average earnings. The Danish social 
insurance scheme paid much higher rates, with a ceiling at roughly 
half of average earnings. The cross-country relativities in the case of 
ill or disabled persons were similar: Irish and Dutch payment rates 
between 21 and 24 per cent, with Danish rates between 35 and 55 
per cent of average earnings. 
For social assistance rates too, Danish payment rates were 
substantially in excess of Irish rates – particularly so in the case of 
lone parents, for whom the Danish system offered a particularly high 
level of support. 
 
 We have seen that Denmark has had one of the lowest relative 
poverty rates in the EU over a sustained period, and that the level 
and structure of its welfare payment rates is substantially different 
from Ireland’s. What if Ireland’s welfare system were to become 
more similar to that of Denmark? Could this lead to a reduction in 
relative income poverty towards the levels seen in Denmark? 
6.4 
Specifying a 
“Danish-style” 
Welfare Policy 
in an Irish 
Context In order to explore this idea, we must probe a little more closely 
into what it might mean to have a “Danish-style” social security 
policy in Ireland. There is no unique answer to this question: 
judgements must be made on a number of key issues – judgements 
on which it is possible to disagree. Here we set out a possible 
example of what such a “Danish-style” social security might look 
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like in an Irish context, noting the judgements involved, and examine 
the implications.17
One key element in the construction of a “Danish-style” policy in 
an Irish context is to increase payment rates for corresponding 
schemes (pensions, unemployment compensation etc.) so that they 
reach the same proportion of average Irish earnings as Danish 
payment rates do in Denmark.  
Payment rates in relation to average incomes are clearly 
important. But with differentiated payment rates across the system, 
actual payment rates can be heavily influenced by the pattern of 
eligibility across different schemes e.g., social assistance versus social 
insurance. 
A further key difference between Denmark and Ireland is that a 
greater proportion of the Danish population is covered for key social 
insurance schemes than in Ireland. As a result, the social assistance 
payment rates are relevant to a smaller group in Denmark than in 
Ireland. Differences in social insurance coverage can arise for a 
number of reasons. If eligibility depends on contributions, then past 
employment history and contribution record becomes critical. But 
for some of the biggest social insurance schemes in Denmark, 
eligibility is linked not to contributions but to residence. “The Danish 
old-age pension scheme is a tax-financed pay-as-you-go scheme 
which is residence-based i.e., how much you get in pension depends 
upon the length of the stay in the country, not your former income 
or contribution record” (Hansen, 2001, p. 9). Social protection 
schemes for long-term illness and disability operate on a similar 
basis. 
In order to capture this feature of the Danish system we apply 
the same payment rate to Old Age Contributory and Non-
Contributory Pensions. While this will capture most of the impact of 
the Danish “residence-based” system as against the Irish 
“contribution-based” system, it does not capture it all. Means-testing 
provisions under the non-contributory pension will reduce payments 
in a manner which would not happen with a full implementation of 
the Danish scheme. Likewise, we simulate the residence-based 
Danish system for long-term illness and disability by attributing a 
rate of payment to schemes such as Disability Allowance and Blind 
Person’s Pension which is equal to the rate for the corresponding 
insurance-based schemes. 
Danish social protection schemes for unemployment and for 
short-term illness are linked to membership of a social insurance 
scheme requiring employee contributions. Benefits vary in relation to 
17 Some more sophisticated exercises in “policy swapping” between countries can 
also be undertaken within the EUROMOD framework. These would take account 
of issues such as whether or not particular benefits are taxable, and/or whether or 
not certain benefits are taken into account in means-testing. Such effects are not 
taken into account here, but are likely to be of “second order” magnitude compared 
to the main effects examined here. 
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earnings, but only in a fairly narrow range between a “floor” and a 
“ceiling”: the ceiling becomes effective at quite a moderate level of 
earnings (about two-thirds of average earnings, according to Hansen 
(2002)). While there are differences in how the Irish and Danish 
systems operate, there is a broad similarity with the insurance/ 
assistance distinction in Irish unemployment compensation.  
Table 6.5 summarises the personal rate payment structure under 
the 1998 Irish system, and under a “Danish-style” system in Ireland 
as outlined above. (Irish pound rates for 1998 have been converted 
to euro at the rate of 1 euro= Ir£0.787564). The Danish rates can be 
grouped into four main categories. These are (from lowest to 
highest): 
• ordinary social assistance, 
• old age pensions, 
• social assistance for lone parents and  
• insurance based benefits for unemployment, illness and 
disability increases from €89.52 to €116.37 per week, an 
increase of 30 per cent. 
Table 6.5: Social Protection Payment Rates, Ireland 1998 and Danish-Style System in Ireland 
Scheme Ireland, 1998 
Danish System in Ireland, 
1998 
 € Per Week € Per Week 
Old Age and Survivor’s Pensions   
Old Age Contributory Pension 105.39 129.17 
Old Age Non-Contributory Pension 92.06 129.17 
Widow's Contributory Pension 94.09 154.93 
Widow's Non-Contributory Pension 89.52 116.37 
Illness and Disability Payments   
Disability Benefit 89.52 194.13 
Disablement Benefit 119.61 204.28 
Injury Benefit 89.52 204.28 
Invalidity Pension 91.68 204.28 
Disability Allowance 89.52 204.28 
Blind Person's Pension 89.52 204.28 
Lone Parent and Family Support   
One Parent Family Payment 89.52 154.93 
Deserted Wife's Benefit 94.09 154.93 
Deserted Wife's Allowance 89.52 116.37 
Maternity Benefit 106.28 159.19 
Carer's Allowance 93.33 129.17 
Unemployment Payments and Social Assistance   
Unemployment Benefit 89.52 194.13 
Unemployment Assistance 89.52 116.37 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance 86.85 116.37 
 
Even the lowest social assistance rate in the Danish system is 
significantly higher, in relation to average earnings, than some of the 
highest personal rates in the Irish system. As a result, even those 
rates (Unemployment Assistance, Supplementary Welfare Allowance, 
Widow’s Non-Contributory Pension and Deserted Wife’s 
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Allowance) which are “mapped” onto the Danish social assistance 
rate see substantial increases on the payment rates in the 1998 Irish 
system. For example, the Unemployment Assistance rate increases 
from €89.52 to €116.37 per week, an increase of 30 per cent. 
The old age pension rate increases from €92 (non-contributory) 
or €105 (contributory) to a level of €129, in order to attain the same 
proportion of average income as the Danish rate. This represents an 
increase of between 23 per cent and 40 per cent. The gap between 
the Irish and Danish income support rates for lone parents, as a 
proportion of average income, is even greater. An increase of over 
70 per cent in the Irish rate would be needed (bringing it from €90 
to €155) if it were to represent the same proportion of average 
earnings as in Denmark. For Unemployment Benefit and Disability 
Benefit the required increase would be 117 per cent, bringing the 
personal rate of payment from €90 to €195.  
The greatest gap, however, is the payment rates for long-term 
illness and disability, where the Irish payment rates would need to 
rise by almost 130 per cent in order to reach the same proportion of 
average income as in Denmark. In 1998 terms, this would mean an 
increase from about €90 per week to around €205 per week. It 
should be noted that the Danish payment rate for long-term 
disability shown in Table 6.6 is the maximum within the system. 
Lower rates apply if the extent of the disability/reduction in labour 
market capacity is less severe, and/or the individual is nearing 
retirement age.  
There are, as noted in the previous section, some additional 
payments in respect of dependant adults in Denmark, but the main 
emphasis is on independent entitlements and claims of individuals, 
whether they are single, married or cohabiting. This contrasts with 
the Irish system in which payments in respect of “qualified adults” 
(formerly termed “adult dependants”) are an integral and important 
part of the system. How best can this be taken into account in 
constructing a “Danish-style” policy to apply in the Irish context? 
There is no simple mechanical answer to this question. Suppose, for 
example, that Ireland switched away from payments in respect of 
qualified adults towards purely individual claims. Some of those 
previously benefiting from a “qualified adult addition” might take up 
employment, as the net reward for so doing might increase. But 
some former “qualifying adults” might now be able to obtain a 
higher income by making an independent social welfare claim (e.g., 
based on age, illness or unemployment). Neither of these potential 
effects can be captured by simply setting qualified adult addition 
rates to zero, since static tax-benefit models cannot take account of 
such changes in behaviour.18  
18 Setting qualified adult addition rates to zero would, in the context of the 
SWITCH-based analysis undertaken here, lead to corresponding income losses for 
families containing a qualified adult. 
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The approach taken here is a pragmatic one, aimed at 
approximating the net impact on welfare recipients incomes. For 
Old Age Pensions, where there is a restriction on the total payment 
to a couple, we treat the “couple rate” less the single rate as the rate 
for a qualified adult. This ensures that pensioner couples receive the 
appropriate rate in most circumstances. For all other schemes where 
“qualified adult additions” may be payable, we use the rather low 
rate (€36.50 per week) payable in the Danish social assistance system 
when a spouse has not been in paid employment and intends to 
remain outside the labour market. Given that typical qualified adult 
additions in the Irish system ranged from €52 to €67, the net effect 
is that payment rates in respect of a couple are somewhat higher 
than before, but the increases are much more moderate than for a 
single person. 
Differences in child dependant additions are somewhat easier to 
deal with. We have seen earlier that typically Danish child benefit 
rates were significantly higher than Irish rates, in relation to average 
income; but that total support in Ireland, from child benefit and 
child dependant additions, was usually somewhere in between the 
minimum and maximum levels of support in Denmark, relative to 
average earnings. The highest child dependant payment rates in 
Denmark are those in respect of the children of lone parents 
(including widows). High rates may also be payable if both parents 
are dependant on a social pension. We have approximated this 
situation by applying the high rate of child dependant addition 
(€18.77) to all lone parent schemes, to the old age pension scheme, 
and to long-term illness payments. For all other schemes 
(unemployment, short-term illness, social assistance) the lower rate 
of payment (€6.44) is used. 
In moving from the Irish system to a “Danish-style” social 
security policy, we have also eliminated the Living Alone Allowance 
(which does not exist in Denmark). Higher individual payments 
would more than compensate those affected. 
 
 The total gross cost of raising Irish social welfare payments to 
rates which formed the same proportion of average earnings as the 
Danish system is estimated at over €2,700 million in 1998 terms. 
Some of this increased social welfare income is taxable, so the net 
cost, allowing for tax revenue arising from the increase, is of the 
order of €2,400 million. A comparison of the two systems which did 
not take account of this would be unbalanced. For this reason, we 
look here at a comparison in which the systems are put on a 
“revenue-neutral” basis i.e., each system must raise the same net 
revenue to finance other government expenditure. 
6.5 
Impact of a 
“Danish-style” 
Policy in Ireland
If the Danish style system were to be financed entirely from 
within the income tax/transfer system substantial tax increases 
would be required. Our estimates suggest that an 11 percentage 
point rise in both standard and top rate taxes (i.e., from 24 to 35 per 
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cent, and from 46 to 57 per cent) would be required. These are 
included in our specification of the Danish-style system examined 
below. Clearly, such substantial changes in tax rates would have 
significant implications for labour market behaviour (see Callan et al. 
(2003) for estimates of likely behavioural responses to tax/transfer 
policy changes). We look first, however, at the potential impact on 
relative income poverty in the absence of any behavioural changes. 
Table 6.6 below shows the potential impact of this expenditure on 
relative income poverty, when measured in relation to mean income. 
Table 6.6: Incidence of Income Poverty Relative to Mean Income: Simulations for Ireland 
under Irish Tax/Transfer System (1998) and under Danish Welfare Payment Rates 
(1998) Financed by Higher Income Tax Rates 
Poverty Line Cut-
off as Per Cent of 
Mean Income 
Head 
Count: 
Irish Policy 
Head 
Count: 
Danish 
Policy 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Irish Policy 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Danish 
Policy 
Weighted 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Irish Policy 
Weighted 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Danish 
Policy 
40 per cent 4.45 4.09 0.61 0.65 0.16 0.17 
50 per cent 17.83 11.64 2.70 2.10 0.64 0.58 
60 per cent 30.71 18.97 6.27 4.21 1.80 1.37 
Note: Relative income poverty lines based on mean household disposable income per adult equivalent: €194.91 
under baseline Irish policy, €194.19 under alternative “Danish” policy.  
 
Looking first at the head count measures, we see that a shift to a 
“Danish-style” social security policy is associated with a reduction of 
6 percentage points in the head count of poverty at half of mean 
income, and a fall of almost 12 percentage points in the head count 
of poverty at 60 per cent of average income. These are substantial 
falls, representing declines of more than one-third in the level of 
poverty on this measure. There is little impact on relative income 
poverty at 40 per cent of average income under any measure, as 
many of those below this line are outside of both the tax and benefit 
systems. 
There are also substantial impacts on the poverty gap (which 
takes account of how far individuals fall below the poverty line 
income) at the 50 per cent line (a fall of over 20 per cent of its initial 
level) and the 60 per cent line (a fall of about one-third). The impact 
on the “weighted poverty gap”, which gives greatest weight to those 
furthest below the line, is attenuated, because, as we have seen, many 
of those falling below the lowest poverty line do not gain from 
welfare increases. Nevertheless, there is a fall of about one-tenth in 
the level of the weighted poverty gap at 50 per cent of average 
income, and a fall of about 25 per cent in the weighted poverty gap 
at 60 per cent of average income. 
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Table 6.7: Incidence of Income Poverty Relative to Median Income: Simulations for Ireland 
under Irish Tax/Transfer System (1998) and Under Danish Welfare Payment Rates 
(1998) Financed by Higher Income Tax Rates  
Poverty Line 
Cut-off as Per 
Cent of Median 
Income 
Head 
Count: 
Irish Policy 
Head 
Count: 
Danish 
Policy 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Irish Policy 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Danish 
Policy 
Weighted 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Irish Policy 
Weighted 
Poverty 
Gap: 
Danish 
Policy 
50 5.14 6.93 0.74 1.10 0.19 0.29 
60 17.47 12.97 2.53 2.63 0.59 0.76 
70 27.69 20.73 5.34 4.59 1.47 1.51 
Note: Relative income poverty lines based on median household disposable income per adult equivalent: €160.58 
under baseline Irish policy, €170.63 under alternative “Danish” policy.  
 
Table 6.7 shows corresponding results for poverty lines based on 
median income. Again, there are sharp falls in the head count of 
poverty at the higher two poverty lines (60 per cent and 70 per cent 
of the median equivalised income). But results for the poverty gap 
show little change, while there is a slight rise in the weighted poverty 
gap measure. The key difference between the mean- and median-
based results is that mean income is approximately the same under 
the Irish or “Danish” policy, but median income rises quite sharply 
under the “Danish-style” policy. 
 
 Aggregate measures indicate that social expenditure forms a lower 
proportion of national income in Ireland than in a number of 
countries with poverty rates among the lowest in the EU. More 
detailed comparisons of eligibility conditions for social insurance 
schemes and payment rates for social insurance and social assistance 
schemes suggest that for many welfare schemes, Irish payment rates 
are lower, relative to average earnings, than in Denmark and, to a 
lesser extent, the Netherlands. In order to investigate the role which 
such policy differences play in explaining differences in relative 
income poverty we constructed a “Danish-style” policy which had 
the following key features. First, payment rates for schemes were set 
so that they represented the same proportion of Irish earnings as the 
1998 Danish scheme rates in proportion to average Danish earnings. 
Second, eligibility for contributory old age and illness/disability 
schemes was widened to reflect the fact that in Denmark eligibility 
depended not on contributions but on the proportion of the labour 
market career spent as a resident in Denmark. Results from this 
analysis indicated that differences in social security policy could 
account for a substantial proportion of the difference in poverty 
rates between Ireland and Denmark. This does not mean, however, 
that there is a simple transition from the Irish welfare system to a 
Danish-style one, requiring only changes in welfare payment rates 
and eligibility conditions. Each system is embedded in a wider social 
setting, and a successful transition to a Danish-style system, if that 
were the goal, could depend also on accompanying changes in terms 
6.6 
Conclusions
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of  conditions attaching to benefit receipt and active labour market 
policy, inter alia.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Ireland is among a group of countries with relative income poverty 
rates that have been at the upper end of the EU-15 range over many 
years. At the same time, a number of other countries have 
maintained relative income poverty rates towards the bottom of the 
EU range. What explains these persistent differences in poverty rates 
across countries? Identifying the main explanatory factors is of 
interest in itself, but can also bring wider benefits in suggesting ways 
in which anti-poverty policies can be improved. Indeed, this links 
with the broader approach to social policy co-ordination under the 
Lisbon agenda. Some of the work done here can be characterised as 
comparing policy in countries with high relative income poverty with 
“best practice” from countries with the lowest relative income 
poverty in the EU. 
7.1 
Issues
The Second Joint Report on Social Inclusion (2004) presents 
relative income poverty rates from the mid-1990s to 2001, drawing 
on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). These 
figures suggest that in the mid-1990s Ireland was among a group of 
countries – also including Spain, Portugal, Greece and the UK – 
where the proportion of persons with incomes below 60 per cent of 
median equivalised income was substantially above average. By 2001, 
Ireland had the highest percentage in the EU-15 below that 
threshold, 8 percentage points higher than the average for the (then) 
EU. Countries with low relative income poverty rates, on the other 
hand, included the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark. 
What accounts for the differences in relative income poverty 
rates between Ireland and these countries? The factors involved are 
many and complex. One might expect that relative poverty would be 
higher in countries where groups with a high risk of poverty form a 
higher proportion of the population. For example, if elderly persons 
tended to have a high risk of poverty in all countries, then countries 
with a greater proportion of this high-risk group could be expected 
to have a higher overall risk of poverty. Other groups often found to 
be at high risk of relative income poverty include children, lone 
parents and persons with a disability or suffering from ill-health. 
Countries with a high incidence of such groups may also be  likely to 
have a higher overall risk of poverty. On the other hand, whether or 
not particular groups have a high risk of relative income poverty 
depends in part on the extent of income support provided through 
the social security or welfare system. Thus, what constitutes a high 
risk group may vary from country to country depending on levels of 
income support and conditions for its receipt. 
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There is no commonly agreed or fully unified method of 
“decomposing” cross-country differences in relative income poverty 
rates. Different approaches are taken in a number of recent papers. 
Biewen and Jenkins (2002) found that the higher rate of relative 
income poverty in the US compared with Britain or Germany is 
mostly accounted for by higher risks of poverty for those with given 
personal or family characteristics, rather than due to differences in 
the distribution of the population over groups with different poverty 
risks. The approach of Bourguignon et al. (2002) is perhaps the most 
unified to date, and deals well with some of the main determinants 
of differences in poverty and income distribution (rates of return to 
education, the distribution of educational qualifications, fertility, 
labour market participation and structure). However, the 
redistributive impact of tax and benefits is specifically excluded from 
their analysis. 
To identify the impact of specific differences in tax and welfare 
systems on relative income poverty, a fully-fledged tax benefit model 
capable of modelling policies under two national systems is required. 
Here this has been provided by the SWITCH tax-benefit model for 
Ireland, with information on the Danish system drawn from the 
EUROMOD tax-benefit model for Europe (Sutherland, 2001). 
 
 Does Ireland’s high relative income poverty rate arise from a 
greater concentration of individuals in high risk categories, compared 
with EU countries with the lowest poverty rates? Or do the 
differences in risks of relative income poverty persist across 
countries when comparing individuals within the same groups (e.g., 
families with many children, the elderly)? This issue was examined by 
“standardising” the distribution of individuals across categories to 
match that of the Netherlands, a country with a low relative income 
poverty rate. The findings were quite clear cut: differences in the age 
profile, pattern of labour force participation and household 
composition do not in themselves appear to play the major role in 
explaining inter-country gaps in poverty risk. Simulating the 
imposition of the Dutch age profile, labour market participation or 
age composition on the Irish data does not reduce the substantial 
gap between Irish and Dutch relative income poverty rates (20 per 
cent and 12 per cent respectively, at 60 per cent of median income). 
Analyses of differences between other countries have come to 
broadly similar conclusions (Biewen and Jenkins (2002) in their 
analysis of the USA, Britain and Germany and Rainwater and 
Smeeding (1997) in an analysis of 8 advanced countries). 
7.2 
Findings
The results concerning labour market structure are of particular 
interest. The standardisation procedure here involved a marked 
reduction in the rate of unemployment in the Irish sample (since we 
took as point of departure the data for 1994, when unemployment 
was much higher), from just over 13 per cent to less than 6 per cent; 
and a shift in the composition of labour market participation, from 
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self-employment and unemployment towards employment. The net 
result, however, was that the relative income poverty rate was little 
changed, and might even increase. 
At first sight this result may seem quite puzzling. The answer lies 
in the fact that median income, on which the poverty threshold is 
based, is also affected. If, instead, we considered a low-income cut-
off which was fixed at the initial relative income poverty line then 
the relative income poverty rate would fall from 20 per cent to 15 
per cent. But the substantial rise in employment in this simulation 
also raises average incomes, so that relative income poverty lines also 
rise, and the proportion of individuals falling below those cut-offs is 
roughly constant at the 60 per cent median income line. For those 
persons making the transition from unemployment to employment, 
and those dependent on their earnings, the transition involves an 
increase in income which is often sufficient to raise them above the 
relative income poverty threshold. This is the direct effect on income 
poverty. But for others who are just above the initial poverty 
threshold, and who may be unemployed, out of the labour force, or 
part of the “working poor”, the rise in average income means that 
their unchanged incomes now fall below the new, higher relative 
income poverty threshold. What our analysis shows is that this 
indirect effect can be a strong one, and can dominate. Similar results 
are obtained by Feres et al. (2002). 
It should be noted that the “reweighting” technique used here 
involves scaling the employee and unemployed populations as a 
whole. Thus, when unemployment is reduced and employment 
increased, it is as if the unemployed are put into jobs which have the 
same average wage (and wage distribution) as total current 
employment. In reality unemployed individuals are likely to have 
lower levels of skill and education and therefore command a lower 
wage in the labour market. Analysis in Callan et al. (1997) suggests 
that two-thirds of the current average wage may be a more realistic 
figure, based on the age and educational qualifications of the 
unemployed. This means that the rise in average income would in 
practice, be on a smaller scale than that implied by the assumption of 
equal average wage levels in the current analysis. In these 
circumstances, the rise in employment would have less impact on 
average income, and could therefore have a greater impact on 
relative income poverty. However, labour market developments in 
the real world may – as in recent Irish experience – involve a fall in 
unemployment and a rise in employment which are better 
approximated by the “balanced expansion and contraction” implicit 
in the reweighting technique. 
Recent Irish experience shows that such results are not simply a 
theoretical possibility but do happen in the real world. Sharp declines 
in unemployment and increases in employment in the late 1990s did 
not reduce the numbers below relative income poverty cut-offs. 
Indeed, recent ESRI studies (Whelan et al., 2003) point to some 
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increases in numbers below relative income poverty thresholds over 
the period when unemployment fell dramatically. 
The impact of these developments on Exchequer finances is 
outside the scope of the analysis undertaken here, but should be 
borne in mind. Falling unemployment reduces welfare expenditure, 
and rising employment boosts income tax revenue and social 
insurance contributions. This leaves government with scope for 
other actions (welfare increases, tax cuts) which could themselves 
have a significant impact on relative income poverty.  
To what extent can inter-country differences in relative income 
poverty rates be attributed to differences in tax/transfer systems? 
Aggregate measures indicate that social expenditure forms a lower 
proportion of national income than in a number of countries with 
poverty rates among the lowest in the EU.19 Aggregate level 
comparisons of “welfare effort” and relative income poverty rates 
suggest that there is a relationship. Data for 1999 suggest that an 
extra percentage point on social security as a proportion of GDP is 
associated, on average, with a reduction of 0.4 percentage points in 
the relative income poverty ratio.20  There is, however, a more direct 
way to examine the possible impact of differences in tax and welfare 
structures on inter-country differences in relative income poverty. 
This involves using a tax-benefit model which can examine the first-
round impact of simulating a “foreign country” policy as well as its 
own domestic policies to arrive at a more precise estimate of how 
much policy differences contribute to the explanation of differences 
in poverty rates. In Chapter 6 we used SWITCH, the Irish tax 
benefit model, in conjunction with information on Danish policies 
generated in the construction of EUROMOD, a tax-benefit model 
for Europe, to undertake such an analysis. The year for which the 
comparison was undertaken was 1998. 
The impact of welfare benefits on relative income poverty 
depends crucially on how benefit payment rates relate to the poverty 
line, which is in turn related to average incomes. For this reason, we 
focus on payment rates in Ireland and in Denmark in relation to 
national average earnings. When “importing” the Danish policy into 
the Irish setting, we ensure that the payment rate provides the same 
proportion of average earnings as in the original Danish setting. 
A further key difference is that a greater proportion of the 
Danish population is covered for key social insurance schemes than 
in Ireland. If eligibility depended on contributions then past 
employment history and contribution record would be critical. But 
for some of the biggest social insurance schemes in Denmark – 
including pensions – eligibility is linked to residence, so that how much 
is paid in pension depends on the length of stay in the country, not 
19 The adjustments suggested by Lawlor and McCarthy (2003) would not alter this 
conclusion. 
20 The poverty measure used is the proportion of households below 60 per cent of 
median income. 
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on former income or contribution record. In order to capture this 
difference, we simulate a “Danish-style” system in Ireland under 
which the payment rates for non-contributory and contributory Old 
Age Pensions are the same, and scaled to provide the same level of 
income in relation to average earnings as the Danish pension. 
As might be expected, there is a substantial cost associated with 
moving to Danish-style payment rates and coverage. The net cost 
(after tax revenue from increased payments) is of the order of €2,400 
million per annum. To arrive at a consistent scenario for evaluation 
of the impact of such a policy, we examine a situation in which the 
standard and top rates of income tax are raised by 11 percentage 
points each (i.e., from 24 to 35 per cent, and from 46 to 57 per cent). 
Clearly, such substantial changes in welfare payments and tax rates 
could have significant implications for labour market behaviour (see 
Callan et al. (2003) for estimates of likely behavioural responses to 
tax/transfer policy changes). Nevertheless it is of interest to explore 
the potential impact of this change to tax and welfare policies on 
relative income poverty. 
Head-count measures of poverty show substantial falls in the 
poverty rate at 60 per cent and 70 per cent of median income e.g., 
the poverty rate at 60 per cent of median income falls by 7 
percentage points (to just under 21 per cent). Similarly there are 
sharp falls at 50 per cent and 60 per cent of mean income e.g., from 
17.8 per cent to 11.6 per cent at 50 per cent of mean income.21 
Differences in the welfare system could account for about two-thirds 
of the initial difference in poverty rates (whereby 19 per cent of Irish 
people were in households below 60 per cent of median equivalised 
income, compared with 12 per cent of Danes). This takes account of 
the need to increase taxes, but does not take account of behavioural 
responses in the labour market. 
What are the broader lessons to be drawn from this analysis? 
Atkinson (2000) has pointed out that:  
Social investment in improving labour market skills and employability, 
or an ‘active welfare state’, is an important part of anti-poverty policy, 
but is not a complete substitute for social spending (Atkinson, 2000) 
 Thus, for anti-poverty policy to make progress requires enhanced 
education and employment opportunities and improved income 
supports. Both elements are necessary – neither is sufficient on its 
own to ensure success in combating relative income poverty. 
The success of countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands 
in keeping relative poverty at low levels over a sustained period 
depends crucially on both of these factors: a high employment rate 
and a comprehensive welfare system ensuring that those without 
income from employment have an adequate income. Each of these 
factors is necessary, but neither on its own can be regarded as 
21 There is little or no impact on poverty at the lowest cut-offs (40 per cent of mean 
or 50 per cent of median income). 
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sufficient to keep relative poverty at a low level. Since the mid- 
1980s Ireland has made the transition from a labour market with 
relatively low participation rates and high unemployment to one with 
high employment and low unemployment. This represents a major 
achievement, and one of the two key elements identified above as 
distinguishing countries with low relative poverty rates such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands from others. Over this period, 
however, relative income poverty in Ireland has remained higher 
than the EU average. Comparison with “best practice”, as identified 
in the EU countries with low relative income poverty rates, strongly 
suggests that a move to a low rate of relative income poverty would 
require a more comprehensive safety net and higher rates of welfare 
payment. 
Such higher spending would of course have to be financed via 
higher taxation, and the implications for economic incentive, 
behaviour and growth are critically important to the policy choices 
made. While progress has been made in trying to measure such 
behavioural effects at the level of the individual and household (see 
for example, Callan et al., 2003), much remains to be done before 
these effects can be comprehensively modelled. At the 
macroeconomic level, the relationship between taxation and 
economic growth is of course hotly debated internationally, and Irish 
experience over the last decade or more has been variously 
interpreted. The results of this study serve among other things to 
highlight the importance of greater clarity on these behavioural and 
macroeconomic relationships, and of the strategic societal choices 
which Ireland has to make. 
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